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ABSTRACT—For decades, it was virtually impossible for a criminal 
defendant to challenge racial discrimination by the police or prosecutors. 
This was because in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the 
Supreme Court set an insurmountable standard for obtaining discovery in 
support of a selective prosecution claim. Equating the roles of prosecutors 
and law enforcement officers, lower courts applied this same standard to 
claims alleging racial discrimination by the police. This high standard led 
courts to deny discovery and stifle potentially meritorious claims. Recently, 
criminal defendants have initiated a wave of challenges to “fake stash house” 
operations, in which federal law enforcement agencies like the ATF and the 
DEA approach people—overwhelmingly people of color—and induce them 
to rob a nonexistent drug stash house. Defense attorneys have argued that 
these practices constitute racially selective law enforcement and that 
Armstrong’s strict standard should not apply to the police. Three federal 
courts of appeals responded by recognizing that the differences between 
prosecutors and law enforcement officers merit lowering the discovery 
standard for defendants alleging racial discrimination by the police. This 
Article is the first to describe and defend this important development in equal 
protection jurisprudence. We argue that other courts should similarly craft a 
lower discovery standard. 
Recognizing that federal courts hear only a fraction of race 
discrimination claims, this Article embraces the spirit of federalism and 
proposes an innovative state-level solution: a state court rule lowering the 
insuperable discovery standard to which most states still cling. This Article 
draws on a recent Washington state court rule aimed at preventing racial 
discrimination in jury selection to propose that state courts adopt a similar 
rule setting a new discovery standard for racially selective law enforcement 
claims. Such a rule would ensure that state-level equal protection claims are 
not blocked at the discovery stage, thus enabling courts to adjudicate those 
claims on the merits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Soon after Leslie Mayfield moved to the Chicago suburbs to escape the 
violence of the city and got a job at LG Electronics, a coworker mounted a 
campaign to rope him into robbing a drug stash house containing over a 
million dollars’ worth of drugs.1 Little did Leslie know that the man nagging 
him to commit a crime was an informant for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
 
 1 See United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Criminal Complaint at 
2, United States v. Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2009), 2009 WL 10652986 (“The 
[criminal informant] further told Mayfield . . . that the home invasion could net approximately fifteen or 
more kilograms of cocaine.”); Sentencing Memorandum & Position Paper on Supervised Release 
Conditions at 24, United States v. Mayfield, No. 15-CR-0497 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2018), ECF No. 151 
(stating that the average wholesale price of cocaine was $83.43 per gram at the time). 
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Firearms and Explosives (ATF). For a time, Leslie was able to resist the 
informant’s overtures. But after Leslie took a loan from the informant to fix 
his broken-down car, Leslie felt he had little choice but to commit the 
robbery to repay the debt.2 
The informant then brought in an undercover ATF agent who told 
Leslie that he was a disgruntled drug courier seeking to rob his employers of 
their drugs. He laid out a get-rich-quick robbery scheme, claiming that the 
stash house would be patrolled by armed guards to encourage Leslie to bring 
others along and arm himself. When Leslie showed up with his brother, 
cousin, and a friend, they learned it was all fake—there were no drugs, no 
armed guards; even the house was a pure figment. 3  All four men were 
charged, convicted, and received sentences ranging from twenty-two to 
twenty-seven years in federal prison.4 
Leslie was arrested as part of what is commonly known as a “fake stash 
house operation.” Every fake stash house operation follows the same basic 
playbook: an informant working for the ATF or the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) approaches someone like Leslie—a person of color in dire 
financial straits—offers him an enticing jackpot, and then introduces the 
target to an undercover agent who describes a heavily guarded house to 
induce him to bring along friends and guns.5 Federal prosecutors and agents 
intentionally set a fictional drug amount that will trigger a high mandatory 
penalty, while the inducement to bring guns triggers an additional and 
 
 2 Mayfield, 771 F.3d at 422–23. 
 3 Id. at 423; Annie Sweeney & Jason Meisner, Convicted in a Controversial Stash House Sting 
Operation, Leslie Mayfield Is Struggling to Rebuild His Life After Prison, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2019, 6:42 
AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-drug-stash-house-sting-20190930-5p7u 
iawtybesrgd5h6kx5wznoy-story.html [https://perma.cc/EX9A-PVRP]. 
 4 See Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 283 (originally sentencing Mayfield to 
322 months in prison); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 224 (sentencing defendant 
Ward to 270 months); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 225 (sentencing defendant 
Kindle to 300 months); Sentencing Order, Mayfield, No. 09-CR-0687, ECF No. 265 (sentencing 
defendant White to 300 months). The government ultimately dismissed the mandatory minimums in 
Mayfield’s case, and he was resentenced and released after serving 114 months in prison. See Sentencing 
Order, Mayfield, No. 15-CR-0497 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2018), ECF No. 160; see also Jason Meisner, Under 
Pressure by Judges, Prosecutors to Offer Plea Deals in Controversial Drug Stash House Cases, CHI. 
TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-atf-stash-house-
prosecutions-20180221-story.html [https://perma.cc/D28S-9PN6] (describing the racial disparity among 
stash house sting operation targets as “so large that there was ‘a zero percent likelihood’ it happened by 
chance”).  
 5 United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that the ATF “has a standard 
playbook” for its stash house operations and “the facts between cases are frequently nearly identical”); 
Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1446–47 
(2013) (“[B]ecause the stash house is entirely imaginary, the police invent other critical details that help 
entice the suspects . . . .”).  
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consecutive mandatory penalty. As a result, defendants typically face a 
mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. 6 
When the targets gather to execute the law enforcement-led “robbery,” 
federal agents arrest them, charging them with conspiracy to commit 
robbery, conspiracy to distribute narcotics, and gun possession. 7  These 
operations have more than quadrupled since 2004.8 
Nationwide, federal law enforcement agencies have overwhelmingly 
targeted people of color to commit these fabricated crimes. In Chicago, from 
2011 to 2013, only one individual out of the fifty-seven charged by the ATF 
in a stash house operation was white.9 In the past decade of stash house cases 
in New York, none of the 179 defendants charged were white. 10 In Los 
Angeles, one agent testified that fifty-five out of sixty stash house defendants 
indicted were people of color.11 A 2014 review by USA Today of stash house 
cases nationwide found that “[a]t least 91% of the people agents have locked 
up using those [stash house] stings were racial or ethnic minorities.”12 In 
 
 6 See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 224 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“Although no cocaine actually existed, the Government decided to entice targeted 
individuals with a predetermined quantity of cocaine—10 kilograms—which was double the amount 
needed to statutorily trigger the mandatory minimum provisions.”); United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 
103–04 (4th Cir. 2016) (“[A] stash house sting entails considerable government involvement—including 
direct solicitation of the target and total control over the parameters of the robbery, particularly the 
quantity of cocaine held in the fictitious stash house—and appears highly susceptible to abuse.”); United 
States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he government has virtually unfettered ability to 
inflate the amount of drugs supposedly in the house and thereby obtain a greater sentence for the 
defendant.”); United States v. Caban, 173 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (“It is unsettling that in this type of 
reverse sting, the government has a greater than usual ability to influence a defendant’s ultimate 
Guidelines level and sentence. . . . [T]he difference in offense levels between 49.9 kilograms and 50 
kilograms under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 potentially could entail as much as 78 months of incremental 
imprisonment.”). 
 7 Tinto, supra note 5, at 1447. 
 8 Brad Heath, Investigation: ATF Drug Stings Targeted Minorities, USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2019, 
11:50 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/20/atf-stash-house-stings-racial-
profiling/12800195/ [https://perma.cc/WUA5-8AL8]. 
 9 Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 15, United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(No. 12-CR-0632-RC), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/report_of_jeffrey_fagan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y78Q-RZT7]. 
 10 Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face Scrutiny in New 
York., WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10-
years-179-arrests-no-white-defendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f6462242-12 
ce-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html [https://perma.cc/7RA2-Q4XY]. 
 11  Maura Dolan, U.S. Appeals Court Expresses Concern About Sting Operations that 
Overwhelmingly Target Blacks and Latinos, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:10 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-sting-9th-circuit-20181015-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XXE7-RK7F].  
 12 Heath, supra note 8 (identifying 635 stash house defendants nationwide from 2004 to 2014 and 
finding 579 were people of color). 
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response to these disparities, defense attorneys across the country are 
mounting equal protection challenges, alleging race discrimination by 
federal law enforcement officers.13 
For decades, it was virtually impossible to hold the police accountable 
for race discrimination. Historically, the legal standards to do so were so 
difficult to meet that Professor Michelle Alexander predicted that “[t]he 
racial profiling cases that swept the nation in the 1990s may well be the last 
wave of litigation challenging racial bias in the criminal justice system that 
we see for a very long time.”14 
Under the Equal Protection Clause,15 criminal defendants can object to 
discriminatory enforcement of the law using two mechanisms: selective 
prosecution claims and selective law enforcement claims. “‘Prosecution’ 
refers to the actions of prosecutors . . . and ‘enforcement’ to the actions of 
law enforcement and those affiliated with law-enforcement personnel.”16 A 
criminal defendant who is charged with a crime can move for dismissal of 
the indictment, arguing that either the prosecutor, law enforcement officers, 
or both violated his equal protection rights by impermissibly singling him 
out on the basis of race.17 
The Supreme Court created an insuperable discovery standard for 
selective prosecution claims in United States v. Armstrong.18 In practice, 
Armstrong’s discovery standard creates an abstract right without a remedy.19 
 
 13 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 991–93 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (alleging an ATF 
reverse-sting stash house operation constituted racially selective law enforcement); United States v. 
Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (alleging a DEA reverse-sting stash house operation 
constituted racially selective law enforcement).  
 14  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 138–39 (2d ed. 2012); see also id. at 109 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made it virtually 
impossible to challenge racial bias in the criminal justice system under the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
it has barred litigation of such claims under federal civil rights laws as well.”). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These protections apply to the federal government as well. See 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985) (noting that the Fifth Amendment imposes the same 
restraints on the government’s exercise of enforcement discretion as the Fourteenth Amendment). Thus, 
on the federal level, these challenges are brought through the Due Process Clause’s equal protection 
component. 
 16 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Garcia-
Pena, No. 17-CR-363-GBD, 2018 WL 6985220, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“A selective prosecution 
claim is . . . an . . . assertion that the prosecutor has brought a charge for reasons forbidden by the 
Constitution. By contrast, a selective enforcement claim is directed solely at police or agent misconduct.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 17  Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (dismissing indictment based on selective 
prosecution); United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that 
“dismissal of an indictment is a proper remedy for a selective enforcement claim if proven”).  
 18 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996). 
 19 Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1139 (2000). 
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Broadly speaking, to get discovery, a defendant must present “some 
evidence” tending to show both discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
intent.20 First, the discriminatory-effect prong requires a defendant to make 
a “credible showing of different treatment of similarly situated persons” of 
another race by the prosecution. 21  However, gathering evidence that 
individuals of a different race were committing the same offense but were 
not charged is a near impossible task.22 Second, a defendant must initially 
present “some evidence” of discriminatory intent on the part of 
prosecutors23—evidence that will be unobtainable without discovery and that 
prosecutors have every incentive to keep secret. Thus, the defendant is 
confronted with Armstrong’s cruel catch-22: he must provide evidence of 
discrimination to obtain discovery about discrimination. 
For many years, courts amplified Armstrong’s catch-22 by improperly 
affording law enforcement officers the same blind deference that Armstrong 
afforded prosecutors. Although Armstrong was a selective prosecution case, 
courts have extended Armstrong’s insurmountable standard to selective law 
enforcement claims alleging that law enforcement officers discriminated on 
the basis of race.24 
As difficult as it is to meet Armstrong’s similarly situated standard in 
the selective prosecution context, it is still harder to meet in the selective law 
enforcement context for two reasons. First, it is impossible for a person of 
color to point to similarly situated white individuals who were not arrested 
because there is no record of such people. Second, without discovery, a 
defendant cannot know what led the police to target him, so he cannot know 
who is “similarly situated” to him. 
In the stash house context, three federal courts of appeals recently held 
that Armstrong should not apply to selective law enforcement claims and 
accordingly lowered the discovery standard. The Seventh Circuit first 
distinguished selective prosecution claims from selective law enforcement 
claims in United States v. Davis.25 The Third and Ninth Circuits then built on 
 
 20 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470. 
 21 Id.; see also Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905) (holding that defendants alleging 
selective prosecution must provide evidence of a similarly situated individual of a different race who was 
not prosecuted but could have been).  
 22 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (“[T]he ‘similarly situated’ requirement renders many meritorious 
claims impossible to prove.”). 
 23 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468. 
 24 See infra Section II.A. 
 25 See 793 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Professor Siegler and her Federal Criminal Justice 
Clinic litigated the defense appeal in Davis. 
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that distinction by eliminating both the granular similarly situated 
requirement and the discriminatory-intent requirement. 26  These three 
decisions created a circuit split, as some circuits still apply the Armstrong 
standard to selective law enforcement claims.27 
This Article is the first to analyze this new wave of challenges to 
racially selective law enforcement and the developments in equal protection 
jurisprudence it has generated. We argue that the path charted by Davis 
correctly recognizes that Armstrong is inapplicable in the selective law 
enforcement context and urge other courts to follow suit. A lower standard 
will enable criminal defendants to obtain discovery and litigate selective law 
enforcement challenges on the merits, a rarity in the decades since 
Armstrong. 
Although the recent courts of appeals cases allow legitimate claims of 
race discrimination by the police to survive the discovery stage in many 
federal courthouses, federal courts hear only a small percentage of criminal 
cases nationwide, exposing them to only a fraction of such claims. Too many 
reforms proposed by scholars neglect our system of dual constitutionalism 
where both federal and state constitutions protect individual rights. This 
Article argues that state courts should likewise adopt a lower discovery 
standard for racially selective law enforcement claims. 
Building on the recent federal cases, this Article proposes a new 
discovery rule that state supreme courts could enact to authorize discovery 
regarding racial discrimination by law enforcement and thus ensure that 
meritorious equal protection claims against the police are not blocked at the 
discovery stage. Our proposed rule draws on a Washington state court rule 
aimed at preventing race discrimination in jury selection. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the history of the merits 
standard for equal protection claims challenging race discrimination in 
criminal cases. It then critiques Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery 
standard for selective prosecution claims. 
Part II explains how, although Armstrong was a selective prosecution 
case, courts have applied its discovery standard to equal protection claims 
against law enforcement officers. Part II then details how the Third, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits have recognized that the two types of claims should be 
treated differently and have departed from Armstrong’s framework, creating 
 
 26 See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Sellers, 
906 F.3d 848, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2018).  
 27 See United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th 
Cir. 2005) (applying Armstrong in the civil context); Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 
2003) (same).  
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a lower discovery standard for racially selective law enforcement claims. It 
argues that those courts were correct to depart from Armstrong for three 
reasons. First, as a doctrinal matter, the police do not enjoy the same 
deference as prosecutors. Second, as a practical matter, Armstrong’s 
requirements are unworkable in the law enforcement context. Third, a lower 
discovery standard is the only way judges can adjudicate claims of race 
discrimination by the police on the merits. Part II concludes that other courts 
should follow suit and abandon Armstrong’s discovery standard in the 
policing context. 
Part III recognizes that federal solutions to race discrimination by law 
enforcement can have only a limited impact, and that state courts regularly 
apply Armstrong’s high discovery standard to both selective prosecution and 
selective law enforcement claims. It then explores a growing body of state 
court rules, laws, and constitutional provisions that are more protective of 
criminal defendants’ rights than the current constitutional standards. 
Part IV identifies a novel avenue for reform: state court rules. 
Embracing the spirit of federalism, we draw on a recent Washington state 
court rule aimed at preventing racial discrimination in jury selection to 
propose that other state courts adopt a similar rule setting a new discovery 
standard for racially selective law enforcement claims. 
I. RACIALLY SELECTIVE PROSECUTION CLAIMS 
Former United States Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H. Jackson remarked that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, 
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”28 Justice Jackson 
explained that the prosecutor’s power to choose his defendants also gives 
him the power to pick “some person whom he dislikes or desires to 
embarrass, or select[] some group of unpopular persons and then look[] for 
an offense.” 29  This ability to selectively target individuals or groups of 
individuals is where “the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power 
lies.”30 
 
 28 Robert H. Jackson, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second 
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 
(1940). 
 29 Id. at 19. 
 30 Id.; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“[T]he breadth of discretion that 
our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for both individual 
and institutional abuse.”). 
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Even so, “although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not 
‘unfettered.’”31 The Equal Protection Clause is one such limit, prohibiting 
enforcement that is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”32 This limit flows from the 
Supreme Court’s recognition that the government’s “obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.”33 
This Part chronicles the development of the constitutional constraints 
on prosecutors by describing the foundations of selective prosecution claims, 
that is, equal protection claims brought against prosecutors. Section I.A 
tracks the development of the merits standard for selective prosecution 
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Section I.B critiques the standard 
that defendants must meet to gain discovery from a prosecutor’s office on 
such a claim, which was laid out in United States v. Armstrong. It explains 
how the Armstrong standard has proven insurmountable in practice—no 
defendant has met the merits standard for selective prosecution since the 
nineteenth century, and few have even obtained discovery. 
A. Pre-Armstrong Cases 
The landmark civil rights case Yick Wo v. Hopkins was the first—and 
to date only—successful selective prosecution action sustained by the 
Supreme Court.34 In that case, a Chinese national, Lee Yick, challenged the 
enforcement of a San Francisco municipal ordinance regulating the licensing 
of laundries.35 The ordinance gave the city’s board of supervisors the power 
to grant or deny laundry licenses.36 Yick, despite “hav[ing] complied with 
every requisite, deemed by the law or by the public officers charged with its 
administration,” was denied a license and subsequently prosecuted for 
operating without a license.37 In his defense, Yick argued that he was singled 
out for prosecution because of his race, a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. He pointed to the undisputed fact that the board had granted eighty 
white individuals permission to operate laundries, while two hundred other 
people of Chinese descent had been denied such permission.38 
 
 31 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 
114, 125 (1979)). 
 32 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). 
 33 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 34 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  
 35 Id. at 357–58.  
 36 Id. at 366.  
 37 Id. at 374. 
 38 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
996 
The Court recognized that, on its face, the law was neutral.39 But the 
Court went on to evaluate the administrators’ intent in enforcing the law, 
concluding that the racial disparity in enforcement was “so unequal and 
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that equal 
protection of the laws which is secured to the petitioners.”40 Missing from 
Yick Wo, however, was a clear articulation of a merits standard for selective 
prosecution claims. While denying two hundred licenses to Chinese 
individuals and granting those same licenses to white individuals might seem 
like an easy case, the Court did not devise a standard to guide future cases. 
Nineteen years later, in Ah Sin v. Wittman, the Court laid out the first 
doctrinal requirement of a selective prosecution claim: a defendant must 
provide evidence of a similarly situated individual of a different race who 
was not prosecuted but could have been.41 In Ah Sin, the defendant alleged 
that a San Francisco County ordinance prohibiting gambling inside one’s 
home was enforced solely against Chinese residents.42 The Court rejected his 
selective prosecution claim, however, because he did not allege “that the 
conditions and practices to which the ordinance was directed did not exist 
exclusively among the Chinese.”43 The Court wanted Ah Sin to point to 
instances of secretive gambling by non-Chinese individuals who were not 
prosecuted. However, the ordinance prohibited individuals from exhibiting 
gambling tables in rooms barricaded from police.44 It would have been nearly 
impossible for Ah Sin to collect evidence to meet the similarly situated 
requirement without trespassing. As the facts of Ah Sin demonstrate, the 
similarly situated requirement is daunting. And this prong is just the start of 
the difficult merits standard defendants face when asserting selective 
prosecution claims. 
For almost seventy years, there was little change in the Court’s selective 
prosecution jurisprudence. Then, in 1976, the Court decided the landmark 
case Washington v. Davis. In that case, the Court clarified that to state an 
equal protection violation a “discriminatory racial purpose” must be shown.45 
Ten years later, in Wayte v. United States, the Court pronounced a two-prong 
merits standard for selective prosecution claims.46 David Wayte was indicted 
 
 39 Id. at 373–74.  
 40 Id. at 373.  
 41 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905).  
 42 Id. at 504.  
 43 Id. at 507–08.  
 44 See id. at 503. 
 45 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976). Discriminatory purpose is also known as discriminatory intent. 
 46 See 470 U.S. 598, 608–09, 608 n.10 (1985). 
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for refusing to register for the Selective Service.47 Wayte moved to dismiss 
the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution, arguing that he and 
other vocal opponents of the registration program were prosecuted while 
many less vocal nonregistrants were not.48 
The Wayte Court began its analysis by noting that “courts [are] properly 
hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute” based on a variety of 
factors. 49  The Court explained its rationale for insulating prosecutorial 
decisions from review: 
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, 
the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the 
Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind 
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this 
area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the 
basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law 
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to 
outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing 
the Government’s enforcement policy.50 
To protect prosecutorial discretion from scrutiny, the Court laid out a 
rigorous standard: an individual challenging prosecutorial decisions on equal 
protection grounds must “show both that the passive enforcement policy had 
a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose,” also known as discriminatory intent.51 Applying these principles, 
the Court held that Wayte failed on both grounds. Regarding discriminatory 
effect, the prosecutions “did not subject vocal nonregistrants to any special 
burden.”52 Regarding discriminatory purpose, Wayte had not established that 
“the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities.”53 
 
*          *          * 
 
Wayte thus settled the merits standard for selective prosecution claims: 
defendants must show discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. In 
 
 47 Id. at 603. 
 48 Id. at 604. 
 49 Id. at 607–08. 
 50 Id. at 607. 
 51 Id. at 608 (emphasis added). 
 52 Id. at 610. 
 53 Id.  
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addition, as a part of the discriminatory-effect prong, defendants must point 
to similarly situated individuals who were not prosecuted, even if the conduct 
at issue is entirely private and unobservable. 54  Obtaining evidence of 
similarly situated persons, much less evidence of discriminatory intent, is 
near impossible without discovery of a prosecutor’s records.55 As a result, 
the standard defendants must meet to gain discovery for selective 
prosecution claims makes all the difference. The Court set that standard in 
United States v. Armstrong.56 
B. United States v. Armstrong: An Insurmountable Barrier 
United States v. Armstrong was decided in 1996, right in the middle of 
the federal government’s War on Drugs.57 The case began in 1992, when a 
task force of ATF and local police officers raided a hotel room occupied by 
Christopher Armstrong and four others and discovered crack cocaine.58 The 
five were subsequently charged federally with conspiracy to distribute more 
than fifty grams of cocaine.59 
The federal public defenders assigned to represent Armstrong noticed a 
disturbing trend—all twenty-four of the defendants their office had 
represented in crack cases during 1991 were Black.60 As a result, Armstrong 
asserted a selective prosecution claim, arguing that he and his codefendants 
were selected for federal prosecution, rather than state prosecution, because 
of their race.61 In support of a motion requesting discovery on this claim, the 
attorneys filed an affidavit attesting to this trend of federal crack 
prosecutions against people of color.62 
 
 54 Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905). Because individually identifiable arrest records 
are not public, it is extremely difficult to determine the names and races of people who were arrested for 
the same offense but not ultimately prosecuted.  
 55 See infra notes 89–92, 96. 
 56 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996). 
 57 JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 17 
(2017) (“It is now widely recognized that the drug war has caused tremendous damage—especially in the 
low-income African American communities that have been its primary target.”); id. at 164 (“[T]he 
[federal drug] law’s harsher treatment of crack defendants became one of the most grotesque examples 
of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system.”).  
 58 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458–59. 
 59 Id. at 458. 
 60 Id. at 459. 
 61 In state court, Armstrong would have faced a sentence of three to nine years, but because federal 
charges were brought, he faced a sentence of fifty-five years to life. See Brief for Respondents at 2–3, 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (No. 95-157), 1996 WL 17111, at *2–3; The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—
Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 166 (1996) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. 
 62 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459. 
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The district court granted the defendants’ motion for discovery, 
ordering the government to provide information on the cocaine cases it had 
handled, its charging criteria, and the race of all the individuals prosecuted.63 
The government refused to comply with the discovery order and the district 
court dismissed the case.64 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed.65 
But the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s discovery order.66 
First, the Court rejected Armstrong’s argument that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 entitled him to discovery regarding his selective prosecution 
claim. The Court held “that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) authorizes defendants to 
examine Government documents material to the preparation of their defense 
against the Government’s case in chief, but not to the preparation of 
selective-prosecution claims.”67 
Second, the Court held that Armstrong had not met the standard to 
obtain discovery for a selective prosecution claim. Like the Wayte Court, the 
Armstrong Court began by listing various reasons why courts have limited 
authority to review prosecutorial decisions.68 Citing separation of powers 
concerns, the Court explained that “[a] selective-prosecution claim asks a 
court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the Executive.”69 
This “special province” is rooted in the President’s delegation to the 
Attorney General of the “constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”70 As a result, prosecutors’ decisions enjoy a 
“presumption of regularity.” 71  Additionally, the Court explained that its 
reluctance to review prosecutorial decision-making “stems from a concern 
not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive 
constitutional function.”72 Such review “threatens to chill law enforcement 
by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside 
inquiry.”73 Finally, review “may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by 
revealing the Government’s enforcement policy.”74 
 
 63 Id. (citing Brief for Respondents, supra note 61, at 161–62).  
 64 Id. at 461. 
 65 United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1510 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), rev’d, 517 U.S. 456 
(1996). 
 66 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 458. 
 67 Id. at 463. 
 68 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. 
 69 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
 70 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
 71 Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). 
 72 Id. at 465. 
 73 Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). 
 74 Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). 
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Despite these concerns, the Court reiterated the long line of precedent 
holding that “a prosecutor’s discretion is ‘subject to constitutional 
constraints,’”75 which include “the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 76  Equal protection principles 
dictate “that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an 
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification.’”77 
In light of these conflicting considerations, the Court laid down the 
standard for obtaining discovery in support of a selective prosecution claim: 
a defendant must present “some evidence tending to show the existence of 
the [two] essential elements of” a selective prosecution claim on the merits—
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. 78  Further, to prove the 
discriminatory-effect prong, a defendant must make a “credible showing of 
different treatment of similarly situated persons.”79 
The discriminatory-effect prong’s “similarly situated” requirement 
demands a comparison with individuals of a different race who could have 
been prosecuted but were not. Drawing on Ah Sin, the Court required 
defendants to “identify individuals who were not black and could have been 
prosecuted for the offenses for which [defendants] were charged, but were 
not so prosecuted.”80 In practical terms, this means that a defendant alleging 
selective prosecution in a federal crack case must determine the identities 
and the racial composition of two groups of people: (1) what we call the 
selected group—all defendants prosecuted for crack by a certain federal 
prosecutor’s office, and (2) the similarly situated benchmark group—others 
of a different race who committed analogous crack offenses but were not 
federally prosecuted. The Court explained that such a “rigorous standard” 
was required because of the above justifications: separation of powers 
concerns and the desire not to impair prosecutorial functions or 
effectiveness.81 
 
 75 Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979)). 
 76 Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)). 
 77 Id. (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 
 78 Id. at 470 (quoting United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)). The Court 
clarified that the “some evidence” standard was not a new rule, observing that various circuits had 
expressed the same standard using a variety of verbal formulations, including “colorable basis,” 
“substantial threshold showing,” “substantial and concrete basis,” and “reasonable likelihood.” Id. at 468. 
 79 Id. at 470. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 468 (“The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-prosecution 
claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in aid of such a claim.”).  
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The Court held that Armstrong had not met the discriminatory-effect 
prong because he had “failed to identify individuals who were not black and 
could have been prosecuted for the offenses for which respondents were 
charged, but were not so prosecuted.” 82  While Armstrong had properly 
identified the selected group (the twenty-four people federal prosecutors in 
Los Angeles had charged with federal crack cocaine offenses in 1991),83 he 
had failed to identify a similarly situated benchmark group. The Court 
explained that identifying similarly situated individuals “should not have 
been an insuperable task” and posited that there might be, for example, 
“similarly situated persons of other races [who] were prosecuted by the State 
of California and were known to federal law enforcement officers, but were 
not prosecuted in federal court.” 84  Further, rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s 
assumption that “people of all races commit all types of crimes,”85 the Court 
pointed to a United States Sentencing Commission Report concluding that 
“[m]ore than 90% of the persons sentenced in 1994 for crack cocaine 
trafficking were black” and determined there was no discriminatory effect.86 
Of course, as the dissent observed, the racial disparity in sentencing says 
nothing about the crime rate across races, since that disparity might itself be 
evidence of racially selective prosecution tactics.87 Nonetheless, the Court 
 
 82 Id. at 470. 
 83 See id. at 459. 
 84 Id. Without access to discovery, it is unclear how a defendant would locate individuals “known to 
federal law enforcement officers” who were not federally prosecuted. Even setting aside that requirement, 
data regarding the races of individuals prosecuted for crack offenses in the state system, rather than the 
federal system, are extremely difficult to obtain. See Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal Criminal 
Justice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution, 48 ME. L. REV. 179, 188 (1996) (“Although 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission publishes detailed information about federal defendants sentenced for 
crack, there is no comparable information available for defendants prosecuted or sentenced for crack at 
the state level. Relevant state statistics are particularly hard to come by because the majority of states do 
not distinguish between crack and powder cocaine for penalty or record-keeping purposes.”). 
 85 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 
1995)).  
 86 Id. (citing U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 107 tbl.45 (1994)). 
 87 Justice John Paul Stevens remarked, “[I]t is undisputed that the brunt of the elevated federal 
penalties falls heavily on blacks. While 65% of the persons who have used crack are white, in 1993 they 
represented only 4% of the federal offenders convicted of trafficking in crack. Eighty-eight percent of 
such defendants were black.” Id. at 479–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that the 
“figures [discussed by the majority] are entirely consistent with the allegation of selective prosecution.” 
Id. at 482. Professor Pamela Karlan later pointed out that Armstrong’s statistics “are exactly what one 
would expect if race were in fact the explanation for the pattern of prosecutorial decisions.” Pamela S. 
Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2025 n.119 
(1998); see also Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop & Lori Pfingst, Race, Drugs, and Policing: 
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 121 (2006) (“[A]lthough a 
majority of drug transactions involving the five serious drugs under consideration here involve a white 
drug dealer, 64 percent of those arrested for drug delivery in Seattle from January 1999 to April 2001 
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concluded that the district court had erred in granting discovery. 88  For 
Armstrong, the similarly situated requirement proved insurmountable, and 
he was unable to meet the discriminatory-effect prong. 
Armstrong’s second prong, discriminatory intent, makes the selective 
prosecution discovery standard still harder to meet. Unless a defendant has 
access to a smoking gun—for example, an admission by the government that 
they targeted the defendant based on his race89 or racist text messages90—it 
is hard to provide evidence of intent before receiving discovery. Many 
discovery motions are denied for failure to provide “some evidence” of 
discriminatory intent.91 As a result, “[t]he bar for selective [law] enforcement 
and prosecution claims has been set at a nearly unreachable height for the 
vast majority of criminal defendants, an example of an abstract right with no 
practical remedy.”92 
Since the Court established Armstrong’s demanding discovery 
standard, there has not been a single successful selective prosecution or 
selective law enforcement claim on the merits. 93  What is more, the last 
 
were black.”); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1825 (1998) 
(“Because the police can more easily attack illegal street markets than other sorts of illegal markets, the 
crack trade has also generated more than its share of police stops and arrests. And because street markets 
for crack are concentrated in poor black communities, a disproportionate number of those arrests and 
sentences have been imposed on blacks.”). 
 88 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470–71. 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 24–26 (2d Cir. 1996). In Al Jibori, the prosecutors 
explained that they targeted the defendant in part because of his ethnicity and nationality. Id. at 24, 26. 
The Second Circuit made clear that if the government had kept quiet, discovery would not have been 
granted. Id. at 25–26; see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 622 & n.76 (describing cases where the 
defendant gets “lucky” by gaining access to data about unprosecuted offenders). 
 90 See, e.g., United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (relying on 
“race-based comments” by some San Francisco police officers for a discriminatory-intent finding and 
granting discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim). 
 91 See, e.g., United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. Alcaraz-
Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mesa-Roche, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 
1176 (D. Kan. 2003); United States v. Maclin, No. 18-CR-122, 2019 WL 1320315, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 
22, 2019); United States v. Garcia-Pena, No. 17-CR-363-GBD, 2018 WL 6985220, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
19, 2018); United States v. Jackson, No. 16-CR-2362-WJ, 2018 WL 6602226, at *7 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 
2018); United States v. Viera, No. 14-CR-83-ER, 2015 WL 3833797, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015).  
 92 Luna, supra note 19, at 1139; see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 640 (“The Armstrong holding 
and the implications of its reasoning create a barrier to discovery that, for the great majority of criminal 
cases, is insuperable.”). Moreover, the concept of “discriminatory intent” is notoriously elusive. See Aziz 
Z. Huq, What Is Discriminatory Intent?, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 1211, 1240–63 (2018).  
 93 See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 215 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The government itself 
concedes that ‘neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found sufficient evidence to permit 
discovery of a prosecutor’s decision-making policies and practices.’” (quoting Brief for Appellee United 
States of America at 31, Washington, 869 F.3d 193 (No. 16-2795), 2016 WL 7034184, at *31)); Kristin 
E. Kruse, Comment, Proving Discriminatory Intent in Selective Prosecution Challenges—An Alternative 
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successful selective prosecution claim at either the state or federal level was 
the very first one that reached the Court back in 1886—Yick Wo.94 In only a 
handful of cases have defendants even been able to meet Armstrong and gain 
discovery.95 In practice, courts often deny discovery motions based on a 
failure to provide sufficient evidence of either similarly situated individuals96 
or discriminatory intent.97 The extraordinary difficulty of obtaining selective 
prosecution discovery in a criminal case stands in stark contrast to the ready 
discovery provided to civil plaintiffs.98 
Armstrong is a deeply flawed decision, as many scholars have 
observed. 99  By valuing prosecutorial discretion above equal protection 
principles, it strikes exactly the wrong balance between deference to the 
executive and individual rights. The Armstrong Court’s concerns about 
chilling prosecutorial discretion mask a recurring “theme in the Court’s 
treatment of race: ‘a fear of too much justice.’”100 Shutting down all selective 
prosecution claims is not the answer. After all, courts review executive 
 
Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. REV. 1523, 1535 (2005) (“[Armstrong] is such a 
‘significant barrier,’ however, that the last selective prosecution claim that was successfully brought was 
the very first case that reached the Supreme Court—Yick Wo.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1539–40 (1981).  
 94 See Vorenberg, supra note 93, at 1539–40; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  
 95 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975, 977–78 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding defendant 
had provided “‘some evidence’ tending to show the existence of discriminatory effect” and discriminatory 
intent based on law enforcement agents’ “outrageous and unprofessional” behavior that included agents 
sending the defendant a postcard that pictured “a black woman with a basket of bananas on her head”); 
United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting defendant’s discovery motion based 
on government’s admission that it targeted defendant in part because of race). For more recent examples, 
see United States v. Coley, No. 17-CR-89-JGC, 2018 WL 6304588, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2018), and 
Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1048, which found that “[d]efendants ha[d] satisfied Armstrong in respect 
to their claim of selective enforcement” and granted discovery in a federal drug sting operation.  
 96 See, e.g., United States v. Thorpe, 471 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hedaithy, 
392 F.3d 580, 608 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Hayes, 236 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Magana, 127 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 97 See supra note 91. 
 98 See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2015) (“If the civil plaintiff, who 
seeks primarily the payment of money, must share his evidence . . . then surely the prosecutor, who seeks 
the defendant’s loss of liberty or life, ought to suffer the same obligations.”); Bruce A. Green, Federal 
Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 642 (2013) (“[T]he 
limited scope of discovery in federal criminal cases cannot easily be reconciled with the liberality of 
discovery in modern civil litigation.”). 
 99 See McAdams, supra note 22, at 640; Karlan, supra note 87, at 2025; Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. 
Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1076–79 (1997); Melissa L. Jampol, Goodbye to the Defense of 
Selective Prosecution, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 932, 954–66 (1997).  
 100 Leading Cases, supra note 61, at 175 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
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decisions all the time in other contexts.101 But here, blind deference to the 
majority tramples the rights of the minority—or minorities, as the case may 
be. And Armstrong’s flaws are multiplied when the deference it affords 
prosecutors is inexplicably imported into an entirely different context—
policing. 
II. RACIALLY SELECTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT CLAIMS 
The exacting Armstrong standard not only strikes the wrong balance in 
the selective prosecution context, but for years has improperly blocked equal 
protection claims against the police. Law enforcement officers may play an 
even bigger role in the criminal legal system than prosecutors. On average, 
between 2011 and 2015, 24% of the U.S. population over the age of sixteen 
had some contact with law enforcement.102 Law enforcement officers’ vast 
discretion creates great potential for racial bias.103 Police “have discretion 
regarding whom to target (which individuals), as well as where to target 
(which neighborhoods or communities).” 104  And discrimination by law 
enforcement officers—both conscious and unconscious—is well 
documented.105 Such discrimination can have lethal consequences.106 
 
 101 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial 
review thereof.”); 5 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 28:1–15 (2d ed. 1984) 
(collecting cases where courts review executive discretion). 
 102  ELIZABETH DAVIS, ANTHONY WHYDE & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CONTACTS 
BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 6 tbl.5 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cpp15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K6B-32MC]. 
 103 See ALEXANDER, supra note 14, at 123. 
 104 Id. 
 105 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 4–
5, 62–78 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6C9R-WBVC] (finding the Ferguson Police 
Department disproportionately harms Black people and such harm can be the result of intentional racial 
bias); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/FQT3-QK9X] (finding the Chicago 
Police Department uses unreasonable force more often with Black people than white people and the 
department has “tolerated racially discriminatory conduct”); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, 
and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 267 (1999) (finding that Black 
drivers are stopped and ticketed by police more often than white drivers); Katherine Beckett, Kris Nyrop, 
Lori Pfingst & Melissa Bowen, Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the Question of Race: Lessons 
from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 419–41, 436 (2005) (finding that the Seattle Police Department’s 
targeting of minorities “reflect[ed] a racialized conception of ‘the drug problem’”).  
 106  See, e.g., Olivia B. Waxman, George Floyd’s Death and the Long History of Racism in 
Minneapolis, TIME (May 28, 2020, 5:14 PM), https://time.com/5844030/george-floyd-minneapolis-
history/ [https://perma.cc/CX73-9RA3] (observing that a white officer who killed George Floyd, a Black 
man, is part of a pattern of police racism in Minneapolis); Kate Linthicum, Louisville Demanded Justice 
After Police Fatally Shot Breonna Taylor. Instead, It Lost Another Black Life, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2020, 
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The challenges criminal defendants face in obtaining the discovery 
necessary to hold the police accountable for racially discriminatory practices 
mirror and exceed the challenges in the selective prosecution context. This 
Part analyzes recent cases that declined to apply Armstrong to equal 
protection claims against law enforcement officers. Section II.A explains 
how, in the years after Armstrong, federal courts regularly applied 
Armstrong’s onerous discovery standard to equal protection claims against 
the police, resulting in the denial of nearly every discovery claim. 
Section II.B details how, more recently, three federal appellate courts 
declined to apply Armstrong’s discovery standard to racially selective law 
enforcement claims and lowered the standard for defendants seeking 
discovery about race discrimination by the police. In addition, it untangles 
the murky and conflicting legal standards that have replaced Armstrong. 
Section II.C synthesizes these recent cases, concluding that a lower 
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims correctly 
appreciates the differences between prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers and enables courts to assess claims against the police on the merits. 
A. Armstrong Applied to Selective Law Enforcement Claims 
For many years, courts applied Armstrong’s legal framework to racially 
selective law enforcement claims. At the merits stage of a selective law 
enforcement challenge, courts applied the selective prosecution merits 
standard articulated in Wayte and reiterated in Armstrong, holding that “[a] 
defendant challenging a criminal prosecution at . . . the law enforcement . . . 
inflection point[] must provide ‘clear evidence’ of discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent.”107 Every circuit to address the issue continues to use 
the same merits standard for both selective prosecution and selective law 
enforcement claims.108 
At the discovery stage of a selective law enforcement challenge, courts 
also applied Armstrong’s standard, requiring defendants to present “some 
 
7:57 AM), https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-06-08/protesters-louisville-police-killing-
breonna-taylor-david-mcatee-george-floyd (last visited Dec. 12, 2020) (reporting that a Black man 
protesting the police killing of an innocent Black woman was himself shot and killed by police).  
 107 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 214 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 108 See Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 35 (1st Cir. 2004) (requiring plaintiff to show “that he was 
treated differently from similarly situated non-African-American motorists and that the action taken 
against him was motivated, at least in part, by his race”); Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 151–
52 (2d Cir. 2012); Washington, 869 F.3d at 214; United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 
1996); Bowlby v. City of Aberdeen, 681 F.3d 215, 227 (5th Cir. 2012); Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 
410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 822–23 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 
1264 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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evidence tending to show” both discriminatory effect and intent.109 Since 
both selective prosecution and selective law enforcement claims are rooted 
in the Equal Protection Clause, courts reflexively assumed Armstrong’s 
discovery standard applied across the board. For example, in United States 
v. Barlow, the Seventh Circuit held that although “Barlow complains not of 
selective prosecution, but of racial profiling, a selective law enforcement 
tactic,” the “same analysis governs both types of claims: a defendant seeking 
discovery on a selective enforcement claim must meet the same ‘ordinary 
equal protection standards’ that Armstrong outlines for selective prosecution 
claims.”110  
The Fourth Circuit,111 Tenth Circuit,112 and district courts across the 
country 113  likewise adhere to this view, applying Armstrong’s discovery 
standard to selective law enforcement claims. In United States v. Alcaraz-
Arellano, for example, Alcaraz-Arellano sought discovery alleging that a law 
enforcement officer’s decision to stop him was motivated by race.114 The 
Tenth Circuit, relying on Armstrong, held that defendants “must produce 
‘some evidence’ of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent” to 
gain discovery.115 The court remarked that “[t]he elements [of the discovery 
standard] are essentially the same for a selective-enforcement claim” and a 
selective prosecution claim.116 
In contrast, before Barlow, the Seventh Circuit had previously 
suggested in the civil context that there might be good reasons for treating 
selective prosecution and law enforcement claims differently. In Chavez v. 
 
 109 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (quoting United States v. Berrios, 
501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
 110 310 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465). Barlow is often cited 
for this proposition. See, e.g., United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2014 WL 1648746, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 17, 2014) (“Defendants’ racial profiling claim is essentially a selective enforcement claim, 
instead of a selective prosecution claim. The two claims are, however, analyzed under the same standard.” 
(citing Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1010)); Urbanique Prod. v. City of Montgomery, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1223–
24 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (quoting Barlow, 310 F.3d at 1010). 
 111 United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying discovery because defendants 
“[did] not put forth ‘some evidence’ making a ‘credible showing’ of the elements of a discrimination 
claim”).   
 112 Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1264. 
 113 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, No. 16-CR-2362-WJ, 2018 WL 6602226, at *6 (D.N.M. Dec. 
17, 2018) (stating that the Tenth Circuit adopted the Armstrong standard for discovery in selective 
enforcement actions (citing Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1264)); United States v. Viera, No. 14-CR-83-
ER, 2015 WL 3833797, at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2015) (“[F]or discovery purposes, [selective law 
enforcement and selective prosecution claims] are analyzed under the same legal standard.”). 
 114 441 F.3d at 1261. 
 115 Id. at 1264 (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470). 
 116 Id.  
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Illinois State Police, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to recognize 
the difference between the two types of claims and to create a lower standard 
of proof for selective law enforcement claims, at least in the civil context.117  
Chavez involved a civil class action § 1983 lawsuit in which Black and 
Hispanic motorists alleged that the Illinois State Police had engaged in racial 
profiling at drug-interdiction checkpoints. 118  Chavez emphasized that 
Armstrong “narrowly focused on the constitutional implications of 
interfering with the prosecutorial function, a factor at the heart of a criminal 
defendant’s claim of selective prosecution.” 119  Chavez, however, was 
stopped by law enforcement officers but never prosecuted.120 The Seventh 
Circuit ultimately concluded that “[t]his case is . . . not like Armstrong” 
because it “involves police conduct, not prosecutorial discretion.”121 
Chavez then somewhat relaxed the standard of proof required to 
demonstrate discriminatory effect. Under Armstrong, a claimant would have 
to show that “similarly situated defendants of other races could have been 
prosecuted, but were not.”122 Chavez observed: “Armstrong emphasized . . . 
the fact that it would not be impossible to name a similarly situated 
individual treated differently in the context of a selective prosecution 
claim.”123 But Chavez recognized that this would be a more difficult burden 
to meet in the selective law enforcement context, because it would be 
virtually impossible to identify a particular individual whom the police did 
not stop.124 Chavez therefore held that the plaintiffs “do not have to provide 
the court with the name of an individual who was not stopped; instead they 
may attempt to use statistics to show that the [police] treated them differently 
than other motorists who were similarly situated.” 125  Despite Chavez’s 
recognition that it is more difficult to provide “similarly situated” evidence 
in the law enforcement context than the prosecution context, that difference 
did not translate into a different discovery standard in the criminal context 
for over a decade.126 
 
 117 251 F.3d 612, 638–39 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 118 Id. at 620. 
 119 Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 120 Id. at 624. 
 121 Id. at 640. 
 122 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). 
 123 251 F.3d at 640. 
 124 Id. at 639–40. 
 125 Id. at 640. 
 126 The court denied Chavez’s motion on the ground that he had failed to meet the granular similarly 
situated requirement to prove discriminatory effect. Id. at 640–45. 
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Although Chavez was a civil selective law enforcement case, the same 
basic question arises in both the civil and criminal contexts: Did the police 
violate the Constitution? While this Article focuses on the criminal context, 
the distinction Chavez drew between prosecutors and the police applies 
equally. 
B. Discovery in Selective Law Enforcement Cases 
 Spurred by racial disparities in the ATF’s fake stash house operations, 
criminal defense attorneys have launched a recent wave of litigation seeking 
discovery to support claims of racially selective law enforcement. Courts 
have reacted by criticizing the fake stash house operation, referring to it as a 
“disreputable tactic,”127 a “tawdry” and “tired sting operation [that] seems to 
be directed at unsophisticated, and perhaps desperate, defendants who easily 
snap at the bait put out for them by [the government agent].”128 The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has accused law enforcement of “trolling for targets” 
when the confidential informant “provocatively cast his bait in places 
defined only by economic and social conditions.” 129  Judges have even 
expressed “disgust with the ATF’s conduct” in these cases.130 
 Three courts of appeals have responded to this recent litigation by 
recognizing the differences between prosecutors and the police and lowering 
the Armstrong discovery standard in the selective law enforcement context: 
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Davis,131 the Third Circuit in United 
States v. Washington,132 and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sellers.133 
After distinguishing Armstrong, these courts jettisoned its impractical 
similarly situated requirement for the discriminatory-effect prong and 
 
 127 United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also id. at 416 (remarking that “[t]he operators of stash houses would pay law 
enforcement to sting potential stash house robbers” because a “sting both eliminates one potential stash 
house robber (unless the defendant was entrapped) and deters other criminals from joining stash house 
robberies, since they may turn out to be stings”).  
 128 United States v. Lewis, 641 F.3d 773, 777 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 129 United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013). For further criticism of stash house 
operations, see Tinto, supra note 5, at 1446–51. 
 130 United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018); 
see also United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772, 786 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Zero. That’s the amount of 
drugs that the Government has taken off the streets as the result of this case and the hundreds of other 
fake stash-house cases around the country. That’s the problem with creating crime: the Government is 
not making the country any safer or reducing the actual flow of drugs.”), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 
United States v. Dunlap, 593 F. App’x 619 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 131 793 F.3d 712, 719–23 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 132 869 F.3d 193, 214–21 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 133 906 F.3d 848, 852–56 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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eliminated the discriminatory-intent requirement. Sellers and Washington 
went on to craft new, lower discovery standards for selective law 
enforcement claims, with the Ninth Circuit holding either prong alone 
sufficient to obtain discovery. This Section chronicles these important 
developments. 
1. Distinguishing Armstrong 
The Seventh Circuit was the first to hold that Armstrong’s discovery 
standard does not apply in the selective law enforcement context. In United 
States v. Davis, defendants charged as part of an ATF fake stash house 
operation sought discovery in support of a racially selective law enforcement 
claim. 134  They established that of the ninety-seven people the ATF had 
selected for its fake stash house operation in Chicago since 2006, seventy-
five were Black, sixteen were Hispanic, and six were white.135 The district 
court granted discovery and the government appealed. 
In Davis, the government argued on appeal that Armstrong applied and 
that the defendants had failed to meet its comparative standard.136 Applying 
Armstrong would have required the defense to make one of two showings. 
First, the defendants would have had to identify one or more similarly 
situated individuals of a different race whom the ATF did not select137—an 
impossible standard, since there is no way to identify the null set of people 
the ATF did not approach to commit a manufactured crime. Alternatively, 
the defendants would have had to identify a similarly situated benchmark 
group138 whose racial composition differed from that of the selected group in 
a statistically significant way.139 But this, too, was an impossible standard for 
the defendants to meet because the government refused to provide 
 
 134 793 F.3d at 714–15. 
 135 Defendants-Appellees’ Brief at 6, Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (No. 14-1124), 2014 WL 1428885, at *6 
(quoting Defendant’s Reply to Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Regarding 
Racial Profiling & Selective Prosecution at 5–6, United States v. Davis, No. 13-CR-0063 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 
7, 2013), ECF No. 120. 
 136 Davis, 793 F.3d at 715; see also Expert Report of Max M. Schanzenbach at 2, United States v. 
Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 12-CR-0632-RC), ECF No. 555 (arguing that “[w]hen 
any one of [Dr. Fagan’s] assumptions is relaxed or tested, the results no longer support an inference of 
racial discrimination”).  
 137 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). 
 138 In this context, the benchmark group would consist of others of a different race who were not 
approached by the ATF but were otherwise similarly situated to the people the ATF had selected to 
commit stash house offenses. 
 139 Reply Brief & Supplemental Short Appendix of the United States at 14, Davis, 793 F.3d 712 (No. 
14-1124), 2014 WL 1664051, at *14 (“Even under the most expansive construction of the similarly 
situated requirement, the entire adult population provides no meaningful basis on which to conduct a 
comparison with these defendants.”). 
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information that would enable the defendants to define a similarly situated 
benchmark group. Specifically, the government refused to disclose the 
ATF’s criteria for selecting defendants for its stash house operation—that is, 
the purportedly race-neutral rules that the agency claimed to use to determine 
whom to target.140 The en banc Seventh Circuit held that the defendants had 
not met Armstrong’s similarly situated requirement because “[t]he district 
court did not identify any similarly situated [white] person who had not been 
prosecuted.”141 
But that was not the end of the inquiry. The Seventh Circuit 
distinguished Armstrong and concluded that a different discovery standard 
should govern selective law enforcement claims.142 The court recognized 
that “Armstrong was about prosecutorial discretion,” not the discretion of 
law enforcement officers. 143  It further observed that there were salient 
differences between police and prosecutors that counseled in favor of a 
different standard.144 Unlike prosecutors, the court explained, “[a]gents of 
the ATF and FBI are not protected by a powerful privilege or covered by a 
presumption of constitutional behavior.”145 The court continued: 
Unlike prosecutors, [law enforcement] agents regularly testify in criminal cases, 
and their credibility may be relentlessly attacked by defense counsel. They also 
may have to testify in pretrial proceedings, such as hearings on motions to 
suppress evidence, and again their honesty is open to challenge. Statements that 
agents make in affidavits for search or arrest warrants may be contested, and 
the court may need their testimony to decide whether if shorn of untruthful 
statements the affidavits would have established probable cause. Agents may 
be personally liable for withholding evidence from prosecutors and thus causing 
violations of the constitutional requirement that defendants have access to 
material, exculpatory evidence. Before holding hearings (or civil trials) district 
judges regularly, and properly, allow discovery into nonprivileged aspects of 
what agents have said or done.146 
 
 140 The Seventh Circuit observed that the law enforcement agency’s targeting criteria could help a 
defendant prove a selective law enforcement claim on the merits: “Analysis of the targeting criteria (and 
whether agents followed those rules in practice) could shed light on whether an initial suspicion of race 
discrimination in this case is justified.” Davis, 793 F.3d at 723. 
 141 Id. at 715. 
 142 Id. at 720–21. 
 143 Id. at 720. 
 144 Id. at 720–21.  
 145 Id. at 720. 
 146 Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted). 
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The court held that these differences justified applying a different discovery 
standard for selective law enforcement claims—one that is lower than 
Armstrong’s selective prosecution discovery standard.147  
Over the next few years, two other federal courts of appeals built on the 
distinctions the Seventh Circuit had drawn between prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers and likewise distinguished Armstrong. In similar 
selective law enforcement challenges to fake stash house operations, the 
Third and Ninth Circuits subsequently agreed with “the core rationale of 
Davis: the special solicitude shown to prosecutorial discretion, which 
animated the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Armstrong . . . does not 
inevitably flow to the actions of law enforcement, or even to prosecutors 
acting in an investigative capacity.” 148  The Third and Ninth Circuits 
bolstered Davis’s reasoning. In United States v. Washington, the Third 
Circuit highlighted a key distinction from prosecutors—law enforcement 
officers’ limited immunity: 
A challenge to a law-enforcement policy also implicates another area where 
immunity is limited. The ATF reverse sting model is familiar to us and other 
courts precisely because it is a defined operation, one with policies, manuals, 
targeting criteria, and standards. Its appearance from coast to coast is not some 
kind of convergent law-enforcement evolution, but instead is due to the 
promulgation of official policies by a federal agency. Claims of unconstitutional 
policies or practices, lodged against entities rather than individuals, often cannot 
be met with qualified or good-faith immunity defenses at all.149 
In United States v. Sellers, the Ninth Circuit joined the Davis and 
Washington courts in recognizing that “[s]elective prosecution is not 
selective [law] enforcement—especially not in the stash house reverse-sting 
context.”150 Like the other courts, the Sellers court summarized the salient 
differences between the two actors: “[A]gents occupy a different space and 
role in our system than prosecutors; they are not charged with the same 
 
 147 See id. at 721–23.  
 148 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Sellers, 
906 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Today we join the Third and Seventh Circuits and hold that 
Armstrong’s rigorous discovery standard for selective prosecution cases does not apply strictly to 
discovery requests in selective enforcement claims like Sellers’s.”). In Sellers, the defendants established 
“that of 51 defendants indicted in stash house reverse-sting operations between 2007 and 2013, at least 
39 were black or Hispanic.” Id. at 851; see also id. (noting that an agent involved in the operation “testified 
that more than 55 of the approximately 60 individuals who have been indicted in his stash house reverse-
sting operations are people of color.”).  
 149 869 F.3d at 219–20. 
 150 906 F.3d at 852–53. 
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constitutional functions, and their decisions are more often scrutinized by—
and in—courts.”151  
The Ninth Circuit highlighted an additional reason for applying a lower 
discovery standard in the law enforcement context. The Sellers court 
observed that the similarly situated element of the discriminatory-effect 
prong was especially daunting when applied to policing: “Asking a 
defendant claiming selective [law] enforcement to prove who could have 
been targeted by an informant, but was not, or who the ATF could have 
investigated, but did not, is asking him to prove a negative; there is simply 
no statistical record for a defendant to point to.”152 The court thus recognized 
that Armstrong’s cruel catch-22 is compounded in the selective law 
enforcement context. As hard as it is to prove discrimination without 
discovery, it is still more difficult to identify particular people who—by 
definition—had no contact with the police.153 
These differences between prosecutors and police led the Third154 and 
Ninth Circuits,155 as well as at least one district court,156 to join the Seventh 
Circuit’s conclusion that “the sort of considerations that led to the outcome 
in Armstrong do not apply to a contention that agents of the FBI or ATF 
engaged in racial discrimination when selecting targets for sting operations, 
or when deciding which suspects to refer for prosecution.” 157  That 
recognition, in turn, set the stage for these appellate courts to depart from 
Armstrong’s discovery standard in the selective law enforcement context and 
forge an entirely new standard for discovery—a key development in 
safeguarding equal protection rights.158 
 
 151 Id. at 853. 
 152 Id. (citing Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 640 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 153 The Third Circuit gestured to this same compounded catch-22 in summarizing Washington’s 
argument: “Washington also points to the difficulty of obtaining pre-discovery statistics in selective 
prosecution cases, arguing that requiring the same in law-enforcement cases—when there are likely to be 
no records of similarly situated individuals who were not arrested or investigated—would transform the 
functional impossibility of Armstrong/Bass into a complete impossibility.” Washington, 869 F.3d at 216; 
see also McAdams, supra note 22, at 617–18 (“When . . . the defendants complain that similarly situated 
Whites are not arrested or prosecuted at all, there will be no records to find to meet the similarly situated 
requirement.”). In United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862, 864 (2002), the Court held that the Armstrong 
standard applies to motions for discovery regarding a claim alleging selective application of the death 
penalty based on race.  
 154 Washington, 869 F.3d at 219–20. 
 155 Sellers, 906 F.3d at 852–54. 
 156 United States v. Lopez, 415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).  
 157 United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 158 Shortly after Davis was decided, the Fourth Circuit cited it with approval, noting that the “Seventh 
Circuit offers cogent analysis” regarding the differences between law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors. United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis, 793 F.3d at 720–21). 
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2. A New Discovery Standard 
 Although the Seventh Circuit held that Armstrong does not govern 
discovery requests in the selective enforcement context, it did not articulate 
a new discovery standard in its place. Davis acknowledged that “[t]he racial 
disproportion in stash-house prosecutions remains troubling, . . . and is a 
legitimate reason for discovery provided that the district court does not 
transgress Armstrong or an applicable privilege,”159 for example, by ordering 
discovery of a prosecutor’s files without satisfying the Armstrong standard. 
The court ultimately found the particular discovery order to be overbroad 
and instructed the district court to pursue a more nuanced approach, but 
recognized that “some of the [defendants’] discovery asks for information 
from supervisors or case agents of the FBI and ATF, and this is outside the 
scope of Armstrong, the executive privilege, and the deliberative-process 
privilege.”160 
Rather than devising a new legal standard, the Seventh Circuit laid out 
a process for district courts to follow at the discovery stage of a selective law 
enforcement claim: “If the initial inquiry gives the judge reason to think that 
suspects of another race, and otherwise similarly situated, would not have 
been offered the opportunity for a stash-house robbery, it might be 
appropriate to require the FBI and ATF to disclose, in confidence, their 
criteria for stash-house stings.”161 At a minimum, this framework authorizes 
judges to require law enforcement agencies to disclose their operational 
criteria based on less than Armstrong requires. It is essential for a defendant 
seeking to litigate a selective law enforcement claim on the merits to obtain 
law enforcement’s criteria because those criteria define the benchmark 
group. For example, if the ATF’s criteria for its fake stash house operations 
are to target people with prior convictions for violence, drugs, and robbery, 
then the benchmark group will consist of the entire universe of people with 
those prior convictions in the same geographic area and time period as the 
operation. If the benchmark group is substantially more white than the people 
the ATF selected—the selected group—that is evidence of discriminatory 
effect. Davis’s lower discovery standard makes it possible for a defendant to 
gather the evidence needed to prove discrimination on the merits. 
 
Despite this nod, the Fourth Circuit ultimately denied the defendants’ motion for discovery based on their 
failure to demonstrate discriminatory intent and did not craft a new discovery standard. Id. at 100. 
 159 793 F.3d at 722. In particular, the district court had found that “the overwhelming majority of the 
defendants named [were] individuals of color.” Id. at 719 (quoting United States v. Davis, No. 13-CR-
0063 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013), ECF No. 124; see also Defendants-Appellees’ Brief, supra note 135, at 2. 
 160 Davis, 793 F.3d at 722. 
 161 Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
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After Davis, the Third and Ninth Circuits fashioned a lower discovery 
standard for selective law enforcement claims, altering both the 
discriminatory-effect and discriminatory-intent prongs of Armstrong. 
Regarding discriminatory effect, both courts eliminated the similarly situated 
requirement, holding that a defendant seeking discovery “need not . . . show 
that . . . similarly situated persons of a different race or equal protection 
classification were not arrested or investigated by law enforcement.” 162 
Accordingly, a defendant alleging race discrimination does not need to 
identify particular individuals who are similarly situated to the defendant but 
were not arrested—such as Ah Sin’s non-Chinese residential gamblers.163 A 
defendant likewise does not need to identify through statistics a granular 
similarly situated benchmark group that is more white than the selected 
group that includes the defendant. Instead, Washington held that a defendant 
seeking discovery must present “a proffer that shows ‘some evidence’ of 
discriminatory effect,” and that “proffer must contain reliable statistical 
evidence, or its equivalent.”164  
 After the elimination of the similarly situated requirement, it is not 
entirely clear what evidence a defendant must provide to meet the 
discriminatory-effect prong under Washington and Sellers. Perhaps a 
defendant can establish discriminatory effect simply by showing that the 
selected group—consisting of himself and others targeted in a certain type 
of law enforcement operation—is composed primarily of people of color, 
without drawing any comparison to a benchmark group.165 But it is more 
 
 162 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 221 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 
848, 855 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[A] defendant need not proffer evidence that similarly-situated individuals of 
a different race were not investigated or arrested to receive discovery on his selective enforcement claim 
in a stash house reverse-sting operation case.”). 
 163 See supra text accompanying notes 41–43 (discussing Ah Sin). In Chavez, the Seventh Circuit 
recognized the difficulty of identifying specific people who were not selected by the police. See Chavez 
v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[P]laintiffs who allege that they were stopped 
due to racial profiling would not, barring some type of test operation, be able to provide the names of 
other similarly situated motorists who were not stopped.”). But see United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 
99–100 (4th Cir. 2016) (defining the proper comparison group in stash house sting operations as 
individuals who would have been “receptive to a stash house robbery scenario” and who the “ATF had 
the means of infiltrating”); United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (requiring 
the defendant to point to individuals that were “actually available for selection by the ATF and willing to 
commit a stash house sting”).  
 164 869 F.3d at 220–21. 
 165 Professor Richard McAdams has previously advocated for this kind of standard in the selective 
prosecution context. McAdams, supra note 22, at 624–25 (proposing the rule that “a court may order 
discovery on a selective prosecution claim if it has a reasonable basis for finding that race and the decision 
to prosecute are correlated, meaning that prosecutors charge a significantly higher proportion of violators 
of the defendant’s race than of other races”). Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann cogently argues that 
requiring any comparative showing (the “counterfactual causal model”) in this context is incorrect 
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likely that Sellers’s statement that a defendant need not proffer evidence 
about “similarly-situated individuals of a different race”166 does not eliminate 
a comparative standard altogether, but simply means that the defendant need 
not identify particular people who are similarly situated to him. Presumably 
the defendant still must present some comparative evidence showing that law 
enforcement officers targeted people of color to a greater degree than their 
representation in the general population or some other benchmark group. 
Washington’s requirement of “reliable statistical evidence,”167 for example, 
suggests that a defendant must provide comparative evidence demonstrating 
a racial disproportion between the selected group and some benchmark 
group. 
One district court, after jettisoning Armstrong’s similarly situated 
requirement for the discriminatory-effect prong, went so far as to require that 
the comparative showing be statistically significant. In United States v. 
Lopez, another fake stash house case, the court held that “the appropriate 
standard is that where a defendant who is a member of a protected group can 
show that that group has been singled out for reverse sting operations to a 
statistically significant extent in comparison with other groups, this is 
sufficient to warrant further inquiry and discovery.”168 The court in Lopez 
found that the defendants had met this standard by showing that “not a single 
one of the 179 individuals targeted in DEA reverse sting operations in SDNY 
in the past ten years was white, and that all but two were African-American 
or Hispanic,” a disparity that was “in stark contrast to the racial makeup of 
New York and Bronx Counties.”169 Like the Third and Ninth Circuits, the 
court in Lopez found that a comparative discriminatory-effect showing was 
 
because it isolates racial signifiers and pretends “the social facts of race [are] not what they are today in 
the United States.” Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal 
Thinking About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1221 (2019). The 
counterfactual causal model does not include a “prior sociological account of the distribution and meaning 
of [everything held constant] by different racial/ethnic groups.” Id. at 1192. As a result, “there is no 
limiting principle on what should or should not be stripped away in order to get at some imagined solid 
state of race or ethnicity.” Id. 
 166 906 F.3d at 855 (emphasis added). 
 167 869 F.3d at 221.  
 168 415 F. Supp. 3d 422, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 169  Id. A district court in New Mexico likewise found discriminatory effect based on a broad 
benchmark group. See Order Granting Discovery at 4, United States v. Casanova, No. 16-CR-2917-JAP 
(D.N.M. June 12, 2017), ECF No. 57. In Casanova, the defendant presented statistical evidence of a 
disparity between the racial makeup of defendants arrested in an ATF drug operation (the selected group) 
and defendants arrested in drug-and-firearm cases in Albuquerque and the District of New Mexico (the 
benchmark group). Id. at 2. The court purported to be applying Armstrong, but nevertheless concluded 
that the defendant had demonstrated both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent and granted 
discovery. Id. at 1, 4. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1016 
sufficient to grant discovery; no evidence of discriminatory intent was 
necessary.170  
 Given these ambiguities, a defendant seeking to demonstrate 
discriminatory effect would do best to gather data about the racial 
composition of the selected group and of the general population with the goal 
of establishing that law enforcement agents arrested people of color to a 
greater degree than is warranted by their representation in the general 
population. For example, on remand, Washington met this new lower 
standard using census data.171 The district court ordered the government to 
provide “[a] list by case name and number of each defendant in every stash 
house robbery sting conducted” by the ATF, including the racial makeup of 
the defendants in those cases, the circumstances of the stash house targeting, 
and information about individuals who were targeted but not arrested.172 
 Regarding the discriminatory-intent prong, both Washington and 
Sellers held that a defendant “need not, at the initial stage, provide ‘some 
evidence’ of discriminatory intent.”173 This was a monumental development 
in equal protection jurisprudence. For the prior two decades, the 
discriminatory-intent requirement—especially in combination with the 
similarly situated aspect of the discriminatory-effect requirement—had been 
an insurmountable barrier for defendants seeking discovery from police and 
prosecutors alike.174  
 The Third and Ninth Circuits differed slightly in the new role each 
ascribed to discriminatory intent. In Washington, the Third Circuit added a 
strange caveat: “[T]he proffer must be strong enough to support a reasonable 
inference of discriminatory intent and non-enforcement” against similarly 
situated people of other races.175 This caveat muddies the waters as it seems 
 
 170 See 415 F. Supp. 3d at 425–27.  
 171 See Motion for Discovery Pertaining to Claim of Selective Enforcement at 5–6, United States v. 
Washington, No. 2:13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2018), ECF No. 319 (using census data to 
compare the racial composition of the relevant geographic area to that of the defendants charged in fake 
stash house operations). 
 172 See Order at 1–2, Washington, No. 13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2018), ECF No. 327. 
This discovery enabled Washington to file a motion to dismiss, which is currently pending. Motion to 
Vacate Judgment & Dismiss Superseding Indictment at 4–6, Washington, No. 2:13-CR-0171-JHS (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 7, 2020), ECF No. 380. 
 173 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 221 (3d Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Sellers, 
906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[O]btaining discovery on a selective enforcement claim does not 
‘require some evidence tending to show the existence of [both] essential elements of the defense, 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent.’” (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 
(1996))).  
 174 See supra Section I.B; supra Part II.  
 175 Washington, 869 F.3d at 221 (emphasis added). 
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to suggest that the defendant’s evidentiary proffer must support an inference 
of the two requirements the court seemingly eliminated.176 Conversely, in 
Sellers, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant raising a selective law 
enforcement claim need only meet one prong of Armstrong, thus rendering 
the discriminatory-intent prong entirely optional.177 Rather than using the 
discriminatory-intent requirement as a bar to discovery, Sellers repurposed 
it as a second avenue for obtaining discovery—if the defendant cannot 
provide some evidence of discriminatory effect, the defendant can instead 
present some evidence of discriminatory intent, such as evidence of overt 
racial bias in the form of racist communications among law enforcement 
officers.178 
 In addition to altering the two prongs of Armstrong, the Ninth Circuit 
lowered the evidentiary threshold for obtaining discovery still further by 
redefining “some evidence” to mean that defendants simply “must have 
something more than mere speculation to be entitled to discovery.”179 The 
court explained that “what that something looks like will vary from case to 
case,” thus giving district courts a great deal of discretion to determine how 
much evidence is enough to grant discovery. 180  This low evidentiary 
threshold stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s requirement that a 
defendant present “reliable statistical evidence” to establish discriminatory 
effect.181  
In a separate concurring opinion in Sellers, Judge Jacqueline Nguyen 
reflected on how law enforcement’s focus on certain geographic areas might 
provide additional proof of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. 
She concluded that “[e]vidence that law enforcement agents or their 
confidential informants scoured disproportionately minority neighborhoods 
in search of stash house reverse sting targets is evidence of discriminatory 
effect.” 182  Regarding discriminatory intent, Judge Nguyen questioned 
 
 176 Cf. id. (holding that a defendant “need not, at the initial stage, provide ‘some evidence’ of 
discriminatory intent”). 
 177  906 F.3d at 856 (“[E]ven if the dissent were correct that Sellers presented no evidence of 
discriminatory effect, evidence of discriminatory intent may be enough to warrant discovery.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 178 Id. at 856 n.11 (“Indeed, even in the selective prosecution context, the Supreme Court left open 
the possibility that direct admissions by prosecutors of discriminatory purpose . . . would entitle the 
defendant to discovery without showing some evidence of discriminatory effect.”); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (relying on “race-based comments” 
by some San Francisco police officers to grant discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim). 
 179 Sellers, 906 F.3d at 856. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Washington, 869 F.3d at 221. 
 182 Sellers, 906 F.3d at 861 (Nguyen, J., concurring). 
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“whether conducting stash house operations almost exclusively in 
neighborhoods known to be black and Hispanic, and excluding 
neighborhoods known to be white, is in fact a ‘facially neutral’ policy,” 
positing that agents “limiting their operations to minority neighborhoods . . . 
[is] also potentially indicative of discriminatory purpose.”183 
Finally, while Davis, Washington, and Sellers increase the likelihood of 
defendants obtaining discovery, no court has lowered Armstrong’s high 
merits standard in the policing context.184 Given the near impossibility of 
identifying similarly situated individuals even with discovery, 185  courts 
should seriously consider lowering the merits standard as well. 
 
*          *          * 
 
Davis, Washington, and Sellers recognized that a strict application of 
Armstrong is inappropriate for selective law enforcement claims. Davis, 
however, did not articulate a clear standard applicable in future cases. 
Washington formulated a new standard in Armstrong’s place: a defendant 
need only present “some evidence” of discriminatory effect and need not 
present evidence of similarly situated individuals or evidence of 
discriminatory intent. Sellers allowed a defendant to meet just one of the two 
 
 183 Id. at 860–61. One district court in New Mexico found that a defendant provided “some evidence” 
of discriminatory intent by highlighting the “ATF’s focus on neighborhoods with a predominantly 
minority population, use of primarily African-American confidential informants (CIs), and targeting of 
African-American neighborhood contacts.” Order Granting Discovery, supra note 169, at 3; cf. Kohler-
Hausmann, supra note 165, at 1188–91 (arguing that discrimination in a hypersegregated city may be 
masked in statistical comparisons because a neighborhood’s “racial history [has] produced a social 
geography [where] few if any majority-black neighborhoods . . . share all relevant characteristics with 
majority-white neighborhoods”). 
 184 See, e.g., Sellers, 906 F.3d at 856 (“Thus, obtaining discovery on a selective enforcement claim 
does not ‘require some evidence tending to show the existence of [both] essential elements of the defense, 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent,’ notwithstanding that the defendant will eventually need 
to show both elements to prevail on the claim.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting United 
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996))). 
 185  At the merits stage in the Chicago stash house litigation, for example, one judge denied 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement because they had not provided 
evidence that the individuals in their similarly situated benchmark group were “actually available for 
selection by the ATF and willing to commit a stash house [robbery].” United States v. Brown, 299 F. 
Supp. 3d 976, 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (emphasis added). Yet the benchmark group was by definition 
composed of people whom the ATF did not approach to commit a stash house robbery. It is therefore 
hard to imagine how a defendant could go about showing the subjective willingness of anyone in that 
benchmark group. This example illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of meeting the similarly 
situated standard, even with discovery in hand. 
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Armstrong prongs and eliminated the impractical similarly situated 
requirement, holding that a defendant need only provide “something more 
than mere speculation” to demonstrate discriminatory effect. Under Sellers 
and Washington, however, it remains unclear whether or to what degree 
defendants are required to present a comparative analysis to demonstrate 
discriminatory effect. 
As this progression demonstrates, Davis ushered in a significant change 
in the discovery standard for defendants challenging racially selective law 
enforcement practices. Although that new standard was honed in the context 
of fake stash house operations, it applies broadly to any case in which a 
criminal defendant is seeking discovery to support a claim of race 
discrimination by the police.186 
C. Resolving the Split in Authority 
In the wake of these three recent circuit court cases, other courts should 
adopt a lower discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims. 
Without a lower standard, potentially meritorious claims cannot move 
forward and discrimination will go unchecked. 
Davis, Washington, and Sellers were correct in adopting a lower 
discovery standard for three reasons. First, the doctrines that underlie 
Armstrong’s selective prosecution holding do not apply in the law 
enforcement context. Second, requiring a similarly situated showing to 
establish discriminatory effect is especially unworkable in the law 
enforcement context. Third, a lower discovery standard is necessary to 
enable criminal defendants to litigate selective law enforcement challenges 
on the merits. 
The first justification for a lower discovery standard in the selective law 
enforcement context relates to the salient differences between prosecutors 
and law enforcement officers. Armstrong, at its core, rests on “the special 
solicitude shown to prosecutorial discretion”—not law enforcement 
discretion. 187  In particular, a “presumption of regularity” supports 
prosecutorial decisions and, “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, 
courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”188 
 
 186 See, e.g., United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1040, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (agreeing 
with the reasoning in Davis and granting discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim in an 
ordinary federal drug sting operation); Order Granting Discovery, supra note 169, at 4 (granting discovery 
in a non-stash house ATF drug sting operation). 
 187 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added). 
 188 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., 
Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). 
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But the “presumption of regularity” does not apply to law enforcement 
officers. Armstrong took the phrase “presumption of regularity” from United 
States v. Chemical Foundation, in which the Court discussed the 
presumption as applied to a “public officer” appointed by the President 
pursuant to an executive order and a statute—someone with far more 
authority than a law enforcement officer. 189  When elaborating on this 
“presumption of regularly,” the Armstrong Court also quoted Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, a case about a prosecutor’s discretion to initiate plea bargaining.190  
The Armstrong Court further explained that prosecutors are accorded a 
presumption of regularity because “the Attorney General and United States 
Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws” 
under Article II, Section Three.191 As a result, a “selective-prosecution claim 
asks a court to exercise judicial power over a ‘special province’ of the 
Executive.”192 But there is no “special province” of law enforcement. In fact, 
“[u]nlike prosecutors, [law enforcement] agents regularly testify in criminal 
cases, and their credibility may be relentlessly attacked by defense 
counsel.”193 The right to cross-examine a witness, guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, is broad. 194  Moreover, “[s]tatements that agents make in 
affidavits for search or arrest warrants may be contested, and the court may 
need their testimony to decide whether if shorn of untruthful statements the 
affidavits would have established probable cause.”195 
In the civil context, law enforcement officers are not afforded the same 
presumption of constitutionality as prosecutors. While prosecutors ordinarily 
are shielded by absolute immunity for their prosecutorial acts, 196  police 
 
 189 272 U.S. 1, 13–15 (1926). 
 190 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). 
 191 Id. (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). 
 192 Id. (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
 193 United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also id. (“They also may 
have to testify in pretrial proceedings, such as hearings on motions to suppress evidence, and again their 
honesty is open to challenge.”).  
 194 See United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting it is well established 
that “[t]he right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right of cross-
examination”); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974) (“[T]he cross-examiner is not only permitted 
to delve into the witness’ story to test the witness’ perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has 
traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness.”). 
 195 Davis, 793 F.3d at 720 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). 
 196 See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–71 (1993); id. at 273 (“[A]cts undertaken by a 
prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course 
of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”); Forrester 
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988) (stating that absolute immunity extends to “Executive Branch 
officials who . . . perform prosecutorial functions that are ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase 
of the criminal process’” (citation omitted)). Even prosecutors, however, are not immune from liability 
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officers and federal agents enjoy no such categorical protection. Rather, law 
enforcement officers receive only “qualified immunity” for personal liability 
in the performance of their duties.197 Law enforcement officers may be held 
personally liable for “withholding evidence from prosecutors and thus 
causing violations of the constitutional requirement that defendants have 
access to material, exculpatory evidence.”198  When a police officer does 
arrest a person without probable cause, the officer may be liable in a civil 
rights suit for damages.199 As the Third Circuit explained forty years before 
Washington, “[t]he special considerations which lead us to grant absolute 
immunity to a prosecutor’s decision to initiate and present a criminal action 
are simply not present when a federal law enforcement officer is charged 
with constitutional violations.”200 
To the extent that any special considerations support deference to law 
enforcement, those considerations carry the least weight when a law 
enforcement policy is challenged. This is especially relevant in the stash 
house context, as such operations appear across the United States not because 
of “some kind of convergent law-enforcement evolution, but instead . . . due 
to the promulgation of official policies by a federal agency.”201 There is no 
qualified immunity for suits brought against entities, such as counties or state 
police agencies, when the alleged violation is an entity-wide policy.202 
Nor do Armstrong’s other justifications for deference apply to law 
enforcement. Armstrong found that deference to prosecutors’ decisions 
“rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and 
 
for actions taken in an investigatory capacity. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (“When a prosecutor performs 
the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer, it is neither appropriate 
nor justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 197 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Professor William Baude recently called into 
question whether such qualified immunity has a constitutional basis. See generally William Baude, Is 
Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018) (arguing that the doctrine of qualified 
immunity is unlawful and inconsistent with principles of statutory interpretation).  
 198 Davis, 793 F.3d at 720; see also Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 381 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(recognizing that “virtually every other circuit has concluded either that the police share in the state’s 
obligations under Brady, or that the Constitution imposes on the police obligations analogous to those 
recognized in Brady”). 
 199 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555–57 (1967); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 200 Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1216 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 201 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The ATF reverse sting model is 
familiar to us and other courts precisely because it is a defined operation, one with policies, manuals, 
targeting criteria, and standards.”). 
 202 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993) 
(“[U]nlike various government officials, municipalities do not enjoy immunity from suit—either absolute 
or qualified—under § 1983.”). 
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courts,” which is “‘not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts 
are competent to undertake.’” 203  But courts see thousands of civil suits 
against police officers each year. 204  While courts have historically been 
hesitant to review decisions of prosecutors,205 no such hesitance exists for 
police officers. To the contrary, when a person is arrested without a warrant, 
courts are actually required to review the police officer’s discretionary 
decision.206 Thus, courts commonly inquire into the arrest process and any 
procedures the officer may or may not have followed. 
Justice Neil Gorsuch recently recognized these distinctions in his 
concurrence in Nieves v. Bartlett, explaining that “enough questions remain 
about Armstrong’s potential application [to the law enforcement context] 
that I hesitate to speak definitively about it today.”207 In support, Justice 
Gorsuch cited the three courts of appeals cases discussed above and 
summarized their conclusion that “the presumptions of regularity and 
immunity that usually attach to official prosecutorial decisions do not apply 
equally in the less formal setting of police arrests.”208 
Finally, Armstrong found that deference to prosecutors’ charging 
decisions “also stems from a concern not to unnecessarily impair the 
performance of a core executive constitutional function,” which may “chill 
law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking 
to outside inquiry.”209 But law enforcement officers do not have the same 
type of “core executive function” to which the Court refers. Prosecutors 
decide when the law should be enforced, and the judiciary is loath to evaluate 
 
 203 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 607 (1985)). 
 204 Section 1983 suits are routinely brought against police officers in their individual capacity. For 
example, data collected in New York City from 2015 to 2018 suggest that at least 152 lawsuits have been 
filed against police officers for violations of the Equal Protection Clause alone. See Legal Aid Soc’y, 




settlement_amount [https://perma.cc/R3RW-RGSD].  
 205 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
 206 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).  
 207 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1733 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
 208 Id. at 1733–34 (first citing United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018); then citing 
United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); and then citing United States v. Davis, 
793 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 209 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 607 (1985)). 
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those decisions due to separation of powers concerns.210 No separation of 
powers concern exists in the law enforcement context. 211  Moreover, any 
chilling effect a lower discovery standard might have on law enforcement 
will be tempered by an important practical limit: for defendants to bring a 
successful selective law enforcement claim, they would need to be arrested 
for a particular crime—such as crack distribution—or as part of a specific 
law enforcement operation—such as a sting operation or drug-interdiction 
checkpoint. They would also need to demonstrate that law enforcement had 
arrested a selected group whose racial composition is different from that of 
the general population (or some other benchmark group). And determining 
the contours of that selected group presents its own challenges.212 
At the end of the day, the time is right to “chill law enforcement” by 
subjecting the police officer’s “motives and decisionmaking to outside 
inquiry.”213 It is both morally and legally troubling that the police can run 
operations that almost exclusively target people of color. Discovery is the 
only mechanism a defendant has to start the process of holding law 
enforcement accountable. Departing from Armstrong is thus an important 
step toward equal justice for all. 
The second reason courts should adopt a lower discovery standard for 
selective law enforcement claims is that Armstrong’s similarly situated 
requirement is unreasonable in the law enforcement context. It is impossible 
to identify a particular white individual whom the police did not target or 
investigate because it is impossible to prove a negative. Identifying similarly 
situated individuals is “especially difficult in policing cases: police keep no 
‘records of instances in which they could have stopped a motorist . . . but did 
not.’”214 Even if the defendant uses statistics, Armstrong’s similarly situated 
 
 210 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“The 
primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been based 
is the separation of powers doctrine.”); Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 (“[A]s an officer of the executive department 
[a U.S. Attorney] exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular 
case. It follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to interfere 
with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States in their control 
over criminal prosecutions.” (citation omitted)). But see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY 
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 210 (1979) (“If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of 
executive officers, then more than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and three-
quarters will have to be found contrary to the Constitution!”). 
 211 See supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text.  
 212 See infra note 301.   
 213 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607). 
 214 Sonja B. Starr, Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate Treatment by Police, 
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 485, 492 n.29 (quoting Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. 
MIA. L. REV. 425, 438 (1997)). 
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requirement would require a defendant at the discovery stage to identify 
white individuals who met the law enforcement agency’s selection criteria, 
but whom police did not target. Yet, without the law enforcement agency’s 
criteria—often the very object of the defendant’s motion for discovery—this 
is impossible. It is unsurprising that “[m]ost—though not all—judges have 
denied defendants’ [selective law enforcement discovery] motions on the 
grounds that they could not prove that ‘similarly situated’ whites were not 
targeted.”215 
Courts recognize Armstrong’s ill fit in the selective law enforcement 
context. As one New Jersey appellate court explained, “In most instances, a 
claim of selective [law] enforcement cannot be proven without discovery of 
police records, which show enforcement patterns during a period of time in 
a given geographical location. These records are usually within the exclusive 
control of the police agency.”216 The Fourth Circuit observed that “[i]n the 
stash house sting context, a defendant . . . face[s] considerable difficulty 
obtaining credible evidence of similarly situated individuals who were not 
investigated by ATF.” 217  Justice Gorsuch recently recognized the Third, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ reasoning that “comparative data about 
similarly situated individuals may be less readily available for arrests than 
for prosecutorial decisions, and that other kinds of evidence—such as an 
officer’s questions and comments to the defendant—may be equally if not 
more probative in the arrest context.”218 
The third reason the discovery standard for selective law enforcement 
claims should be lowered is to allow courts to adjudicate police 
discrimination claims on the merits. For example, the new standard set in 
Davis enabled Professor Siegler and her Federal Criminal Justice Clinic to 
obtain discovery about the ATF’s selection criteria for its Chicago stash 
house operations and the racial composition of the selected group—the 
ninety-four defendants targeted in stash house operations in Chicago from 
2006 to 2013219—as well as extensive criminal history data to determine the 
 
 215 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 165, at 1190. 
 216 State v. Halsey, 774 A.2d 693, 699 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). 
 217 United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 101 (4th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Lopez, 415 F. 
Supp. 3d 422, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). 
 218 Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1733–34 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing United 
States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2018); then citing United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 
193, 219 (3d Cir. 2017); and then citing United States v. Davis, 793 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2015)).  
 219 See Motion to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement at 9–10, United States v. Brown, 
299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 12-CR-0632-RC), ECF No. 518. 
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universe of individuals who met the ATF’s selection criteria.220 Armed with 
this information, the Clinic retained Professor Jeffrey Fagan to produce an 
expert report. Professor Fagan used the ATF’s selection criteria and the 
criminal history data obtained in litigation against the Illinois State Police to 
identify a benchmark group, identifying 292,442 individuals who met the 
ATF’s selection criteria but were not pursued for fake stash house 
operations.221 Fagan then used several statistical analyses to compare the 
racial composition of the benchmark group (72.2% nonwhite; 55.4% Black) 
with the racial composition of the selected group (91.5% nonwhite; 78.7% 
Black). 222  Fagan concluded: “The results of several empirical analyses 
converge to show a pattern of discrimination by defendant race and ethnicity 
in the targeting of Black and Hispanic persons for fictitious Stash House 
stings.”223 
Based on Fagan’s report, the Clinic litigated the issue on the merits, 
filing motions to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement on behalf of 
forty-three indigent federal criminal defendants charged in twelve fake stash 
house cases in Chicago, including Leslie Mayfield.224 The nine federal judges 
presiding over the cases held an unprecedented joint evidentiary hearing on 
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.225 In the wake of that hearing, the United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois made highly 
unusual plea offers, offering to dismiss all of the mandatory-minimum gun 
and drug charges.226 Many of the forty-three defendants who were originally 
facing fifteen to thirty-five years in prison received time-served sentences 
and were released.227  None of this would have happened if the Seventh 
Circuit had strictly applied Armstrong’s discovery standard in Davis.  
 
 220 See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (“The government estimates that as a result of the Court’s 
orders, more than 5,000 pages of [discovery] materials have been disclosed.”). In addition, Professor 
Siegler obtained state-level criminal history data that included race in a separate proceeding. Id. (“To 
assist Professor Fagan in obtaining the data necessary to conduct his analysis, the Court presided over 
protracted third-party subpoena proceedings involving the Illinois State Police[, resulting in] an extensive 
amount of crime data being turned over . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 221 See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., supra note 9, at 5–6, 20.  
 222 Id. at 17 tbl.3.1, 18 tbl.3.2, 22.  
 223 Id. at 36. 
 224 See United States v. Paxton, No. 13-CR-0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018) 
(describing the motions to dismiss filed in the twelve criminal cases “after extensive discovery, expert 
analysis and a unique hearing before the nine judges from this district who had false stash house cases on 
their calendars”); Motion to Dismiss for Racially Selective Law Enforcement, supra note 219, at 25 
(arguing that “[t]he Fagan Report’s statistical analyses create a strong inference that the ATF intentionally 
targeted racial minorities”).  
 225 Paxton, 2018 WL 4504160, at *1; see also Meisner, supra note 4.  
 226 Meisner, supra note 4.  
 227 See id.; Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 3.  
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The bottom line is that Armstrong is a bad fit for the selective law 
enforcement context—both doctrinally, as the underlying rationales do not 
apply, and functionally, because in practice the similarly situated 
requirement is impossible to meet. Moreover, the discovery standard 
matters. Relaxing that standard enables judges to evaluate meritorious 
claims, which in turn can lead prosecutors to reassess whether to move 
forward with prosecution.228 Courts should therefore revisit their discovery 
standards for selective law enforcement claims and depart from Armstrong. 
III. STATE-LEVEL REFORM 
Federal courts are only part of the story. Most law enforcement 
interactions involve local police,229 and about 87% of all prisoners are held 
in state systems.230 While Davis, Washington, and Sellers took important 
strides toward full enforcement of equal protection rights on the federal level, 
state courts still apply Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery standard to 
selective law enforcement claims. As a result, Armstrong often thwarts state 
defendants seeking selective law enforcement discovery, either under the 
federal Equal Protection Clause or a state constitutional equivalent. 
A state-level solution is needed to ensure that meritorious equal 
protection claims are not blocked by Armstrong’s impossible discovery 
standard. Too often, efforts to address discrimination by police focus 
exclusively on federal-level reforms. Reformers and scholars tend to forget 
that the United States has a system of dual constitutionalism, where both the 
federal Constitution and state constitutions protect individual rights.231 As 
Justice William Brennan observed in a famous article, “State 
constitutions . . . are a font of individual liberties, their protections often 
 
 228 In addition to the Chicago stash house litigation, after a federal district court in San Francisco 
granted discovery in support of a selective law enforcement claim, United States v. Mumphrey, 193 F. 
Supp. 3d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2016), the government dismissed the cases against thirty-seven defendants 
arrested as part of an ATF drug sting operation, Notice of Dismissal, Mumphrey, No. 14-CR-0643-EMC 
(N.D. Cal. Jan 25, 2017), ECF No. 293 (order approving government’s notice of dismissal with 
prejudice). 
 229  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, NATIONAL SOURCES OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA 2 & tbl.1 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/nsleed.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TM48-4HP4] (estimating 1,076,054 full-time state and local law enforcement officers 
in 2012).  
 230  JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 13 (2017). 
 231 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1 (1998) (“Americans live under a 
system of dual constitutionalism, but one would hardly know it.”). 
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extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
federal law.”232 
Section III.A traces state courts’ adoption of Armstrong’s discovery 
standard for both selective prosecution and law enforcement claims. Section 
III.B identifies recent state-level reforms in other contexts that are more 
protective of criminal defendants’ rights than the federal Constitution. In 
particular, it looks to state court rules, state statutes, and reinterpretations of 
state constitutional provisions. It further explains how each of these 
mechanisms is a potential vehicle for reforming the discovery standard for 
selective law enforcement claims brought in state courts, setting the stage for 
Part IV to ultimately propose a new state court rule. 
A. Armstrong on the State Level 
State courts have generally applied Armstrong’s discovery standard to 
both selective prosecution and selective law enforcement claims brought 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts in California,233 New Jersey,234 
Colorado, 235  Washington, 236  and Pennsylvania 237  all do so. As one 
Pennsylvania court explained, “in cases of alleged selective enforcement,” a 
party “needs to produce evidence ‘tending to show the existence of the 
essential elements of the defense, discriminatory effect and discriminatory 
intent.’” 238  Pennsylvania, like other states, roots this standard in 
 
 232 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 233 People v. Sanchez-Esceverre, No. C065460, 2011 WL 5138080, at *1, *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 
2011) (applying Armstrong’s “some evidence” standard to a claim that Hispanic drivers were singled out 
for enforcement of traffic laws). In fact, California’s discovery rules “prohibit[] any discovery in a 
criminal case which is not expressly mandated by statute or required by the U.S. Constitution.” People v. 
Superior Ct. (Baez), 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706, 714 (Ct. App. 2000); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054(e), 
1054.5(a).  
 234 State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735, 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that although the 
lower court applied a slightly different standard for discovery, the court “doubt[ed] that the two tests 
[New Jersey and Armstrong] are substantially different”). 
 235 People v. Valencia-Alvarez, 101 P.3d 1112, 1116 (Colo. App. 2004) (“To obtain discovery on 
this issue, the defendant need not establish a prima facie case of selective enforcement. The defendant 
must, however, provide some evidence tending to show the existence of both discriminatory effect and 
discriminatory intent.” (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996))). 
 236 State v. Johnson, No. 52123-3-I, 2005 WL 353314, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that 
“[t]he Armstrong decision was in the context of selective prosecution, not selective enforcement” but 
ultimately concluding that for discovery purposes “the requirement for a determination of who is similarly 
situated used for selective prosecution claims should be applied here”). 
 237 KC Equities v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 95 A.3d 918, 934 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014).  
 238 Id. (quoting Koken v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 911 A.2d 1021, 1031 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)).  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1028 
Armstrong.239  No state court has yet recognized the distinction the three 
federal courts of appeals have drawn between selective prosecution and 
selective law enforcement. 
Only Arizona has independently considered the discovery standard for 
selective law enforcement claims under its own constitution and adopted 
Armstrong. In Jones v. Sterling, the Arizona Supreme Court extended 
Armstrong’s discovery standard to selective law enforcement claims when 
interpreting a provision of Arizona’s constitution mirroring Article II’s 
executive power provisions. 240  The defendants asserted that police 
conducting traffic stops had engaged in racially selective law enforcement, 
requested discovery, and moved for appointment of an expert witness under 
Arizona’s discovery rules. 241  The expert appointment issue turned on 
whether the defendants had met their burden for obtaining discovery.242 
Although the court was not bound to follow Armstrong, it nevertheless 
drew parallels between the Arizona constitution and the United States 
Constitution and extended Armstrong’s discovery standard to selective law 
enforcement claims. The court concluded that the policy reasons animating 
Armstrong were also present in the selective law enforcement context, 
explaining that the “Arizona Constitution, like its federal counterpart, 
charges the executive branch with the duty to ensure that the ‘laws be 
faithfully executed.’” 243  As a result, the court imposed Armstrong’s 
“demanding standard” on the defendants.244  
B. State Law Reforms 
Our federalist system allows for states to protect individual rights to a 
greater degree than the federal government. Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution define a 
constitutional minimum of protection; that is, they set the federal floor. But 
these decisions do not prevent states from setting higher standards for 
combatting discrimination. In recent years, states have enacted legislation, 
passed criminal rules of procedure, or interpreted their own constitutions to 
provide more protections to criminal defendants than the federal 
 
 239 The case the court quoted in laying out the standard for selective law enforcement cases cites 
Armstrong. See Koken, 911 A.2d at 1031. Additionally, the opinion clearly lays out the distinction 
between selective enforcement and selective prosecution claims. See KC Equities, 95 A.3d at 934. 
 240 110 P.3d 1271, 1278–79 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc). 
 241  Id. at 1272–73. Jones was African American, while Rodriguez-Burgos and Rodriguez were 
Latino. Id. at 1272. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.9(a) enables indigent defendants to apply for 
funding for experts. 
 242 Id. at 1279. 
 243 Id. at 1278 (comparing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 with ARIZ. CONST. art. 5, § 4). 
 244 Id. at 1278–79. 
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Constitution. For example, states have enacted new rules to combat racial 
discrimination in jury selection and enlarge prosecutors’ obligation to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. This Section discusses those reforms and 
suggests how the same mechanisms could be used to create new state-level 
discovery standards for racially selective law enforcement claims. 
1. State Court Rules 
Most state courts’ rulemaking authority allows them to promulgate 
rules governing their practices and procedures. The source of courts’ 
authority varies from state to state and often comes from state statutes, state 
constitutions, or a court’s inherent authority. 245  State court rules cover a 
broad range of areas, from court interpreters to access to records to security 
to jury selection. Recently, some states have achieved criminal justice 
reforms using state court rules. For example, Washington adopted a state 
court rule that extends protections against discrimination in jury selection, 
and several state courts have promulgated rules that expand a prosecutor’s 
required discovery disclosures. These new rules provide a valuable model 
for setting a new discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims. 
A recent rule adopted by the Washington Supreme Court to combat race 
discrimination in jury selection demonstrates how reform can be enacted 
through state court rules. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court set a 
high “purposeful discrimination” standard for race-based jury selection 
claims.246 Batson’s purposeful discrimination requirement is analogous to 
Armstrong’s discriminatory-intent requirement, as both expect the defendant 
to provide difficult-to-procure evidence of intentional discrimination. Batson 
has been widely criticized for providing scant protection to defendants 
seeking to challenge racial discrimination in jury selection. 247  Like 
Armstrong, Batson is insurmountable for many defendants.248 
 
 245 See CHRISTOPHER REINHART & GEORGE COPPOLO, CONN. OFF. OF LEGIS. RSCH., COURT RULES 
IN OTHER STATES-LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL, at tbl.1 (2008), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-
0430.htm [https://perma.cc/K3RR-SXLK].  
 246 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986).  
 247 See Jonathan Abel, Batson’s Appellate Appeal and Trial Tribulations, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 713, 
716–26 (2018) (summarizing critiques).  
 248 See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the 
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1092 (2011) 
(examining 269 federal civil and criminal Batson decisions over a nine-year period and finding that relief 
in the form of a new trial was granted in fewer than 7% of the cases and that in “85.1% [of the] cases, the 
court rejected the Batson claim altogether”); EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING LEGACY 4 (2010), https://eji.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ 
illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG4A-Z9HT] (presenting two years 
of research in eight southern states that “uncovered shocking evidence of racial discrimination in jury 
selection”).  
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The Washington Supreme Court recognized Batson’s unworkability, 
concluding that “[t]wenty-six years later it is evident that Batson . . . is 
failing us.”249  The court cited a growing body of evidence showing that 
“Batson has done very little to make juries more diverse or prevent 
prosecutors from exercising race-based challenges.” 250  In response, the 
Washington Supreme Court assembled a working group to formulate a new 
state court rule to rectify Batson’s shortcomings. The working group 
included defense attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and practitioners who 
agreed that “[t]he proposed rule should not simply codify Batson and its 
progeny.”251 
Eventually, the Washington Supreme Court adopted General Rule 37, 
which provides additional protections against discrimination in jury 
selection.252 The rule replaces Batson’s “purposeful discrimination” standard 
with an “objective observer” test, stating that the judge should grant the 
objection if “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor” 
in the peremptory strike, even if the court does not find that “purposeful 
discrimination” is afoot.253 The rule further defines an “objective observer” 
as someone who “is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious 
biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair 
exclusion of potential jurors.”254 Additionally, the rule lists presumptively 
invalid reasons for a peremptory challenge. This list includes the many 
purportedly race-neutral reasons that typically shield prosecutors’ strikes of 
prospective jurors, like prior contact with law enforcement, distrust of law 
 
 249 State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 334 (Wash. 2013) (plurality opinion) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 
545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005)), abrogated on other grounds by City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124 
(Wash. 2017). 
 250 Id. In Saintcalle, the court relied heavily on Justice Stephen Breyer’s concurring opinion in 
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231. Justice Breyer explained that “studies and anecdotal reports suggest[] 
that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains a problem.” Id. at 268 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (collecting sources).  
 251  WASH. CT. JURY SELECTION WORKGROUP, PROPOSED NEW GR 37—JURY SELECTION 
WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT 3 (2018) [hereinafter WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT], 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-
1221Workgroup.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM44-LWLK]. Recall that state courts are not bound by the low 
level of protection that Batson affords criminal defendants. Rather, because Batson is rooted in the Equal 
Protection Clause, it defines a constitutional minimum of protection; that is, it sets the federal floor. 
Nothing prevents states from combatting discrimination in jury selection more aggressively, whether 
through court rules or legislation.  
 252 WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37. For an in-depth analysis of the rule, see Annie Sloan, Note, “What to Do 
About Batson?”: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 233 
(2020).  
 253 WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37(e). 
 254 Id. 37(f). 
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enforcement, living in a high-crime neighborhood, not being a native English 
speaker, and so on.255 
Rule 37 also codifies the concept of comparative juror analysis.256 The 
Supreme Court and lower courts have held that it is evidence of purposeful 
discrimination if a prosecutor’s reason for a given peremptory strike applies 
equally to an otherwise similarly situated juror of another race or gender who 
was not struck from the jury.257 Yet, unlike several state and federal courts,258 
the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that comparative juror analysis 
is sufficient to prove a Batson violation. Rule 37 moves the law forward by 
codifying the varieties of comparative juror analysis that can lead to the 
conclusion that discrimination is afoot. 
Other state supreme courts have also begun to explore whether to adopt 
a similar rule to address Batson’s many shortcomings. Recently, the Supreme 
Court of California convened a work group to consider whether its current 
standard for peremptory strikes is sufficient to eliminate discrimination.259 
Connecticut and North Carolina have similarly formed work groups to study 
racial bias in jury selection.260 
In the discovery context, state courts have expanded criminal 
defendants’ right to obtain exculpatory evidence beyond the federal 
constitutional standard set in Brady v. Maryland.261 Brady doctrine imposes 
an onerous requirement that defendants establish “materiality”: prosecutors 
are only required to disclose exculpatory evidence if the defendant 
 
 255 Id. 37(h). 
 256 Id. 37(g). “When a court undertakes comparative juror analysis, it engages in a comparison 
between, on the one hand, a challenged panelist, and on the other hand, similarly situated but 
unchallenged panelists who are not members of the challenged panelist’s protected group.” People v. 
Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 201 (Cal. 2017). 
 257 See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1741 (2016) (finding impermissible discrimination when 
a prosecutor struck a Black juror because she was “too young” and “divorced” yet allowed white jurors 
to remain who were younger and also divorced); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 261–63 (2005) 
(finding a prosecutor’s practice of seating white people but striking Black people who held identical 
opinions about the minimum sentence for murder was discriminatory). 
 258 See, e.g., Gutierrez, 395 P.3d at 203; People v. Beauvais, 393 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. 2017); People 
v. Sánchez, 375 P.3d 812, 874–75 (Cal. 2016) (Liu, J., concurring) (collecting state cases from Illinois, 
New York, and Alabama, as well as cases from six federal courts of appeals). 
 259 Supreme Court Announces Jury Selection Work Group, CAL. CTS. NEWSROOM (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/internal_redirect/cms.ipressroom.com.s3.amazonaws.com/262/files/202
00/SupCt20200129.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UBT-CXHP].  
 260 Beth Schwartzapfel, A Growing Number of State Courts Are Confronting Unconscious Racism 
in Jury Selection, MARSHALL PROJECT (May 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/05/11/a-growing-number-of-state-courts-are-confronting-
unconscious-racism-in-jury-selection [https://perma.cc/S4T2-CZ7D]. 
 261 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
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establishes that the evidence has a “reasonable probability” of affecting the 
outcome of the trial or sentencing.262 Justice Thurgood Marshall critiqued the 
materiality prong as “enabl[ing] prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously 
exculpatory evidence” by deeming that evidence nonmaterial. 263  The 
materiality prong means that only the most egregious failures to disclose 
evidence lead to reversal on appeal.264 Like the standards in Batson and 
Armstrong, Brady’s materiality requirement is too demanding to provide any 
meaningful protection for defendants and bars otherwise meritorious 
claims.265 
Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s Criminal Procedural 
Rules Committee published notice of a proposed amendment that seeks to 
remove the demanding “materiality” requirement. 266  The amendment 
explains:  
[The exculpatory evidence rule] was amended in 2019 to remove the provision 
of “materiality” from the requirement of mandatory disclosure by the 
prosecution of information favorable to the defense. While originally intended 
to convey the idea that the information was relevant to the case at issue, the 
 
 262 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that, regardless of request, favorable 
evidence is material and must be disclosed “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); accord Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–44 (1995). 
 263 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that a materiality standard means 
“there is no constitutional duty to disclose evidence unless nondisclosure would have a certain impact on 
the trial[,] . . . permit[ting] prosecutors to withhold with impunity large amounts of undeniably favorable 
evidence”). 
 264 See Christopher Deal, Note, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose 
and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1780, 1793 n.77 (2007) (“With Brady, prosecutors 
have no mandatory procedure to follow or neutral observer to placate. They are not duty-bound to serve 
the interests of the defendant. Instead, they can withhold nonmaterial evidence for any or no reason; and 
the guiltier the defendant seems, the more evidence they can withhold.”).  
 265 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1543 
(2010) (“When Brady issues do come to light, the materiality test is a heavy burden for a defendant to 
overcome on appeal.”); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat 
of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 432 (2001) (discussing a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette study that “found 
that prosecutors intentionally withheld evidence in hundreds of cases during the past decade, but that 
courts overturned verdicts in only the most extreme cases”); Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and 
Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 647 (2002) 
(describing the Supreme Court’s increasingly narrow reading of “materiality” as a significant hurdle for 
defendants). 
 266  SUP. CT. OF PA. CRIM. PROCEDURAL RULES COMM., NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING: 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF PA. R. CRIM. P. 573, at 1–2 (2019), https://www. 
pacourts.us/assets/uploads/Resources/Documents/Publication%20Report%20Rule%20573%20Mandato
ry%20Disclosure%20In%20Discovery%20-%20008207.pdf?cb=534af [https://perma.cc/5NUB-4JWB]. 
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term had become more narrowly defined in practice and used as an obstacle for 
disclosure.267 
The proposed amendment thus aligns itself with ABA Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.8(d) and various state court ethical rules that likewise 
eliminate the materiality component and require disclosure of all favorable 
evidence regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.268 
Similarly, Alaska269 and Hawaii270 have state court rules that appear to 
remove or modify the “materiality” requirement. A number of federal district 
courts have local rules that explicitly require disclosure of favorable 
evidence “without regard to materiality.”271 
State courts could institute similar rules to codify the new racially 
selective law enforcement discovery standard established by the federal 
courts of appeals. State courts could go even further and devise a system that 
authorizes the appointment of experts to assist defendants in establishing 
their selective law enforcement claim. Part IV more fully explores this 
possibility by proposing a new state court rule. 
 
 267 Id. at 8. 
 268 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 
8; In re Larsen, 379 P.3d 1209 (Utah 2016); In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202 (D.C. 2015); VA. STANDING 
COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, LEGAL ETHICS OPINION 1862: “TIMELY DISCLOSURE” OF EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE AND DUTIES TO DISCLOSE INFORMATION IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 2 (2012) (opinion of 
Virginia Legal Ethics Committee); In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland, 820 N.W.2d 672, 678 (N.D. 
2012); In re Jordan, 913 So. 2d 775 (La. 2005).  
 269 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(3) (requiring prosecutors to disclose “information . . . which tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused . . . or would tend to reduce the accused’s punishment” without reference 
to materiality). Interpreting this rule, Alaska courts have articulated a relatively lower requirement for 
disclosure than Brady. When evidence “was known to the prosecution and subject to discovery under 
Criminal Rule 16 but not disclosed, the defendant[] . . . need only show that the ‘undisclosed evidence 
might have affected the judgment of the jury or the outcome of the trial.’” Roseman v. State, No. A-659, 
1985 WL 1078004, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1985) (quoting Maloney v. State, 667 P.2d 1258, 
1264–65 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)). 
 270  Hawaii Rule of Penal Procedure 16(b)(1)(vii), which governs the disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence in felony cases, does not contain a materiality requirement on its face. Cf. HAW. R. PENAL P. 
(16)(d) (providing discovery in misdemeanor cases only “[u]pon a showing of materiality”). The explicit 
inclusion of a materiality requirement in misdemeanor cases suggests that the court intentionally omitted 
any materiality requirement for the disclosure of favorable evidence in felony cases. See State v. 
Townsend, 784 P.2d 881, 883–84 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989) (“[I]n a case involving a felony, Rule 16 
discovery is automatically available to the parties as a matter of right. However, the parties in a 
misdemeanor case may resort to discovery only by grace of the court’s discretion, upon a showing of 
materiality and reasonableness.”). 
 271  LAURAL HOOPER, DAVID RAUMA, MARIE LEARY & SHELIA THORPE, A SUMMARY OF 
RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND 
DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES 12 & n.32 (2011), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/file/17996/download [https://perma.cc/KSY6-Q5BF]. 
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2. State Statutes 
State statutes provide another vehicle for reform. In both the civil and 
criminal contexts, state legislatures commonly determine the scope and 
duties of the discovery process, such as the default number or length of 
depositions, the scope of discovery, or procedures for electronically stored 
evidence. 272  Overall, most states’ discovery statutes tend to be more 
expansive than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.273 All states except 
Delaware, Indiana, and Nevada have statewide criminal discovery rules, 
promulgated either legislatively or judicially.274 
Texas’s Michael Morton Act is one recent example of criminal justice 
reform accomplished through a legislative change in discovery standards. 
Texas passed the Michael Morton Act275 in 2013 in response to a series of 
high-profile instances of prosecutorial misconduct, later rectified by 
exonerations.276 The Act radically changed criminal discovery in Texas by 
creating an open-file policy, which obviates the need for defense counsel to 
continually request discovery and eliminates delays in discovery 
production.277 The Act also attempted to relax the standard for disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence by rejecting Brady’s prohibitive “materiality” 
standard, just as the courts of appeals broke with Armstrong.278 The rule 
 
 272 See, e.g., S.B. 224, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess., at 7, 9, 13, 18 (Mo. 2019) (limiting 
interrogatories, providing additional procedures for privileged materials, clarifying that electronically 
stored evidence is discoverable, and imposing time limitation on depositions); ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 
16(a)(1)–(2) (establishing automatic disclosure of evidence by prosecutors in criminal cases).  
 273 Emily Dyer, Chelsea Stacey & Adrian Viesca, Statewide Rules of Criminal Procedure: A 50 State 
Review, 1 NEV. L.J.F. 1, 23 (2017); see also Baer, supra note 98, at 3 (“State legislatures are increasingly 
adopting more generous discovery regimes, many of which impose earlier and more rigorous disclosure 
requirements on prosecutors.”). 
 274 See Dyer et al., supra note 273, at 23 & n.157. 
 275 Michael Morton Act, ch. 49, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 83d Reg. Sess. 106 (codified as an amendment 
to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2014)). In 2012, a federal exculpatory evidence bill 
that would have eliminated the materiality requirement was proposed in the United States Congress but 
died in committee. See Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 3014 (2012).  
 276  See TEX. APPLESEED & TEX. DEF. SERV., TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE: THE 
MICHAEL MORTON ACT’S FIRST YEAR 1–7 (2015) [hereinafter TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT 
JUSTICE], https://www.texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/2015MortonAct-FinalReport.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YK9E-WYGC]. 
 277 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14; Riley E. Clafton, Note, A Material Change to 
Brady: Rethinking Brady v. Maryland, Materiality, and Criminal Discovery, 110 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 307, 340–47 (2020).  
 278 See S. COMM. ON CRIM. JUST., BILL ANALYSIS, S. 590-1611, 83d Reg. Sess., at 1 (Tex. 2013), 
https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/83R/analysis/pdf/SB01611S.pdf [https://perma.cc/BVS2-DNBD] 
(“Every defendant should have access to all the evidence relevant to his guilt or innocence, with adequate 
time to examine it.”); TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE, supra note 276, at 22 (“Under the Act, 
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requires automatic disclosure of all “exculpatory, impeachment, or 
mitigating” evidence that “tend[s] to reduce the punishment for the offense 
charged.”279 Texas courts, however, have ignored the Act’s clear design and 
gutted this provision by clinging to older language in the statute that uses the 
word “material” in a wholly different context.280 
Many other state legislatures have deviated from Brady and the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure by requiring that prosecutors automatically turn 
over a broader category of relevant evidence to defendants.281 The Minnesota 
and North Carolina legislatures have enacted the most expansive open-file 
discovery statutes in the country.282 
In this vein, state legislatures could pass a new discovery standard for 
selective law enforcement claims that is not bound by Armstrong. Notably, 
before addressing the constitutional question, Armstrong held that Rule 16 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not apply to discovery in 
support of a racially selective prosecution claim.283 A state legislature could 
similarly sidestep the constitutional question altogether by creating a state 
rule of criminal procedure codifying a discovery standard for disclosing 
evidence about race discrimination by the police. 
 
information must be disclosed without any materiality analysis or anticipation of its impact on the case’s 
outcome.”).  
 279 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(h). 
 280 Id. art. 39.14(a); see Watkins v. State, 554 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Tex. App. 2018) (“[T]he definition 
or standard we must use to determine whether the objectionable evidence was material is the same after 
the passage of the Michael Morton Act as it was before passage, regardless of what the Legislature may 
have thought or intended to accomplish.” (emphasis added)); Clafton, supra note 277, at 344–47, 345 
n.232 (collecting cases and prosecutors’ briefs advancing this position).  
 281 See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 779 
(2017) (“About thirty states provide defendants with broader discovery than the federal rule by partially 
or fully embracing these standards, which are more generous with respect to both witness lists and 
witnesses’ prior statements.” (citation omitted)). New York, for example, recently overhauled its criminal 
discovery statute, instituting an open-file system that requires prosecutors to automatically disclose a 
wide variety of evidence and implementing timelines for disclosure. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20 
(McKinney 2020). 
 282 See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01 subd. 1 (requiring disclosure of “all matters within the prosecutor’s 
possession or control that relate to the case”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903(a)(1) (West 2016) 
(requiring disclosure of the “complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and 
prosecutors’ offices involved”); see also Grunwald, supra note 281, at 789–90 (examining Minnesota and 
North Carolina’s expansive discovery rules). Nevertheless, courts in both states have read Brady’s high 
materiality standard into their rules regarding disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See Pederson v. State, 
692 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2005); State v. Dorman, 737 S.E.2d 452, 472 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). 
 283 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463 (1996). 
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3. State Constitutional Provisions 
A third way states reform criminal discovery is by interpreting their 
own constitutions to provide greater protection to defendants. Since state 
constitutions work independently from the federal Constitution, states should 
chart different paths than the Supreme Court. But state courts often lockstep, 
imitating federal courts’ interpretations of federal constitutional provisions 
when interpreting analogous state constitutional provisions. Lockstepping is 
unwise and antifederalist. Instead, state courts should interpret their own 
constitutions to forge a new discovery standard for racially selective law 
enforcement claims. 
The United States Constitution is often called a “federal floor of 
individual rights.”284 While the “Supremacy Clause forbids state courts from 
providing less protection than what the U.S. Constitution guarantees,”285 the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution does not “limit the 
authority of [any] State . . . to adopt in its own Constitution individual 
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”286 
As Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton remarked, “[S]tate guarantees may be 
the most promising source of rights, [and] state courts the most promising 
venue for vindicating them.” 287  In the context of an equal protection 
challenge to school funding, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that “nothing 
in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state 
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.” 288 
Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court has explained that its 
constitutional holdings do “not affect the state’s power to impose higher 
standards on searches and seizures than required by the federal Constitution 
 
 284 See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 106 
(2014) (“The U.S. Constitution reflects the federal floor of individual rights because the Supremacy 
Clause forbids state courts from providing less protection than what the U.S. Constitution guarantees.”); 
Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s 
Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, 
70 ALB. L. REV. 865, 875 (2007) (“All American citizens are guaranteed the protections of the United 
States Constitution. This guarantee is sometimes described as the federal floor.”). 
 285 Douglas, supra note 284, at 106. 
 286 Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 
714, 719 (1975) (“[A] State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police 
activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 287  JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (2018). 
 288  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 133 n.100 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
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if it chooses to do so.”289 And in his final majority opinion, Justice Antonin 
Scalia underscored that “state courts may experiment all they want with their 
own constitutions, and often do in the wake of this Court’s decisions.”290 
Despite these precedents, state courts tend to look to federal case law 
for guidance on interpreting analogous provisions of state constitutions. 
State courts “lockstep” by “analyz[ing] the analogous rights in the state 
constitution as conferring the same level of protection as their federal 
counterparts,” diluting individual rights down to the federal floor.291 Judge 
Sutton critiques this practice, arguing that state courts “diminish their 
constitutions by interpreting them in reflexive imitation of the federal courts’ 
interpretation of the Federal Constitution”—a “grave threat to independent 
state constitutions, and a key impediment to the role of state courts in 
contributing to the dialogue of American constitutional law.” 292  Indeed, 
lockstepping eviscerates the dual constitutional protection that citizens of 
federal and state polities should enjoy.293 
Historically, state courts have broken out of lockstep and departed from 
the Supreme Court’s one-size-fits-all interpretation. For example, in 
affirming the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court of California held 
that prosecutors could not use pre-Miranda statements to impeach a 
defendant who testifies, and “pause[ed] . . . to reaffirm the independent 
nature of the California Constitution and [its] responsibility to separately 
define and protect the rights of California citizens.” 294  In doing so, the 
Supreme Court of California broke from federal precedent that allows 
prosecutors to impeach a testifying defendant with pre-Miranda 
statements.295 
In the discovery context, at least two state supreme courts have 
interpreted their state constitutions to set a lower materiality standard than 
 
 289 Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). 
 290 Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 118 (2016). 
 291 Douglas, supra note 284, at 106.  
 292 SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174; see also Goodwin Liu, Brennan Lecture, State Constitutions and 
the Protection of Individual Rights: A Reappraisal, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1307, 1338 (2017) (“A state court 
may recognize individual rights that go unrecognized by the Supreme Court because of textual or 
historical considerations unique to that state or its constitution. . . . But there is nothing illegitimate about 
a state court rejecting the Supreme Court’s interpretation of a parallel constitutional provision on grounds 
that are not state-specific.”).  
 293 See Douglas, supra note 284, at 122 (“[L]ockstepping goes against the ideal of judicial federalism, 
which suggests that state constitutions should play a significant role in protecting individual liberties.”); 
see also Brennan, supra note 232, at 503 (“[O]ne of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides 
a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens.”).  
 294 People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 295 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
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Brady. In State v. Shepherd, the New Hampshire Supreme Court explained: 
“[O]ur constitutional analysis differs from that under the Federal 
Constitution regarding when the defendant has the burden to prove 
materiality.” 296  The court explained that under the New Hampshire 
constitution, if the defendant proves that the prosecution knowingly withheld 
“favorable, exculpatory evidence,” “there is a presumption that the evidence 
is material and the burden shifts to the State to prove, beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” that the evidence is not material.297 The court justified this departure 
by explaining that Brady’s standard “impose[s] too severe a burden upon the 
defendant.”298 New York’s highest court similarly broke with Brady long 
before its legislature enacted sweeping discovery reform.299 The court held 
that, under the due process clause of the state constitution, evidence withheld 
in the face of a specific discovery request is “material” as long as there is “a 
‘reasonable possibility’ that the failure to disclose the exculpatory [evidence] 
contributed to the verdict.”300 
In the selective law enforcement context, states need not apply 
Armstrong’s insurmountable discovery standard to claims brought under 
analogous state constitutional equal protection provisions. 301  Many state 
constitutions have equal protection clauses which can be interpreted to 
provide more protection to criminal defendants than the federal 
Constitution.302 In one decision, Massachusetts’s highest court concluded 
that “evidence of racial profiling is relevant in determining whether a traffic 
stop is the product of selective [law] enforcement violative of the equal 
protection guarantee of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.”303 The 
 
 296 State v. Shepherd, 977 A.2d 1029, 1034 (N.H. 2009). 
 297 Id. at 1035 (quoting State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1995)). 
 298 Id. 
 299 See supra note 281 for a summary of New York’s recent discovery reform. 
 300 People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920–21 (N.Y. 1990) (explaining that the court was rejecting 
the “reasonable probability” standard because “a backward-looking, outcome-oriented standard of review 
that gives dispositive weight to the strength of the [prosecutor’s] case clearly provides diminished 
incentive for the prosecutor . . . thoroughly to review files for exculpatory material, or to err on the side 
of disclosure where exculpatory value is debatable”). 
 301  Of course, Armstrong did not address selective law enforcement claims, only selective 
prosecution claims. Therefore, even under the federal Constitution, a state court could set a lower 
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims, as the Third and Ninth Circuits did. 
 302 See, e.g., S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 18 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of 
citizens or corporation, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to 
all citizens or corporations.”); M.G.L.A. CONST. art. I, pt. I (Massachusetts) (“All men are born free and 
equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right 
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; 
in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.”).  
 303 Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 690 (Mass. 2008). 
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court recognized that its holding “[did] not consider whether the same result 
would be reached under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.”304 
Similarly, states should not lockstep with Armstrong for selective law 
enforcement discovery claims. Instead of blindly adopting Armstrong’s 
standard, state courts should interpret their own state constitution’s equal 
protection clause to authorize discovery under a standard akin to the Third 
and Ninth Circuits’ standard. Such an approach is especially prudent given 
the distinctions the federal courts of appeals have drawn between the 
selective law enforcement context and the selective prosecution context in 
Armstrong. 
Under this approach, even cases like Jones v. Sterling could come out 
differently. In Jones, the defendants brought a selective law enforcement 
claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, not the Arizona constitution’s equal 
protection provision, but sought discovery under Arizona’s discovery rules. 
The Arizona Supreme Court adopted Armstrong, reasoning that the United 
States Constitution and the Arizona constitution describe executive power 
similarly. 305  Regardless, the court could have concluded that the 
prosecutorial considerations underlying Armstrong do not translate into 
Arizona’s separation of powers structure, perhaps recognizing that law 
enforcement officers historically do not enjoy the same level of state 
constitutional protection as prosecutors. If a state claim had been brought, 
however, the court would have had an entirely clean slate to set its own 
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims. After all, states are 
bound only by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and are free to interpret their own equal protection 
provisions more expansively.306 
Finally, because Armstrong did not address selective law enforcement 
claims, states deciding such claims are not bound by any particular 
interpretation. Even if a claim is brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
a state court may be animated by different policy considerations that lead it 
to reject Armstrong’s application to the selective law enforcement context, 
including the very same considerations that spurred three federal courts of 
appeals to depart from Armstrong. 
 
 304 Id. at 690 n.2. 
 305 Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271, 1278 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc). 
 306 See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. 
L. REV. 817, 837–38 (1994); SUTTON, supra note 287, at 7–21, 173–78.  
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Critics argue that lockstepping is good because it creates uniformity and 
predictability in outcomes at the federal and state levels.307 But “[t]here is no 
reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of 
independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, 
must be construed in the same way.”308 The considerations that nine Supreme 
Court Justices must weigh when interpreting the United States Constitution 
are distinct from each state’s constitutional considerations. From an 
originalist perspective, the drafters’ intentions are likely to be different, 
especially in newer states. 309  From a purposivist perspective, the social, 
economic, and other contextual circumstances are similarly bound to 
differ. 310  As a result, highly generalized guarantees in the federal 
Constitution, such as the prohibition on “unreasonable” searches, do not 
necessarily “have just one meaning over a range of differently situated 
sovereigns.”311 
Moreover, “[f]ederalism considerations may lead the U.S. Supreme 
Court to underenforce (or at least not to overenforce) constitutional 
guarantees in view of the number of people affected and the range of 
jurisdictions implicated”—considerations to which states, as sovereigns, 
should pay no attention.312 In the equal protection context, this concern rings 
 
 307 State v. Florance, 527 P.2d 1202, 1209 (Or. 1974) (explaining the importance of uniformity in 
search-and-seizure law); People v. Gonzalez, 465 N.E.2d 823, 825 (N.Y. 1984) (same); see also Earl M. 
Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1006–23 (1985) (arguing that 
expansive state court interpretations of individual rights result in unnecessary duplication and uncertainty 
about the scope of such rights).  
 308 SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174. 
 309 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 170 (2009) (rejecting 
the idea that “interpretations of the federal Constitution can somehow authoritatively set the meaning for 
similar provisions of state constitutions”); see also Jeremy M. Christiansen, Originalism: The Primary 
Canon of State Constitutional Interpretation, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341 (2017).  
 310 A classic example of this is differing treatment of riparian rights based on the location of the state. 
In eastern states, where water is more plentiful, anyone whose land borders a body of water may use a 
reasonable amount. Western states, where water is scarce, follow a prior appropriation rule, which 
establishes water rights based on the first person to put it to beneficial use. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, 
The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53 (2011). 
 311 SUTTON, supra note 287, at 174; see also id. at 17 (“In some settings, the challenge of imposing 
a constitutional solution on the whole country at once will increase the likelihood that federal 
constitutional law will be underenforced, that a ‘federalism discount’ will be applied to the right. State 
courts face no such problem in construing their own constitutions.” (footnote omitted)); Goodwin Liu, 
State Courts and Constitutional Structure, 128 YALE L.J. 1304, 1339 (2019) (reviewing SUTTON, supra 
note 287) (“[S]ome constitutional issues are inherently complex and, as a practical matter, might be best 
resolved on a state-by-state basis rather than through one-size-fits-all adjudication for the entire nation.”). 
 312 SUTTON, supra note 287, at 175. Judge Sutton parallels James Madison’s insight in Federalist 
No. 51 that dividing power “between two distinct governments,” in addition to dividing power within 
each government, is vital to securing our basic rights and liberties. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Liu, supra note 311, at 1308 (declaring Judge Sutton “a 
true believer in Madison’s insight” in Federalist No. 51).  
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especially true. For example, states that have a history of particularly 
egregious discrimination or police misconduct may want to have lower 
discovery standards than others. 
In sum, our dual constitutional system empowers states to 
independently determine the rights guaranteed by their constitutions. Such 
independent, state-specific interpretation is preferable to states lockstepping 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretations. In the selective law enforcement 
context, states are not bound by federal precedent because the Court has not 
mandated that the Armstrong standard be applied. Accordingly, state courts 
should interpret their state constitutions to authorize a less demanding 
discovery standard for selective law enforcement claims. 
IV. A NEW DISCOVERY STANDARD ON THE STATE LEVEL 
Armstrong’s standard is not workable in the selective law enforcement 
context. Yet, as long as state courts continue to employ the insuperable 
Armstrong standard, defendants challenging race discrimination by the 
police will be denied discovery, and both state and federal equal protection 
guarantees will go unfulfilled. 
Rather than waiting for the discovery standard to evolve through the 
uncertain and slow common law process, states can proactively change the 
standard through one of the avenues of reform discussed above—state court 
rules, state statutes, or state constitutional provisions. Of these, state court 
rules are the most promising. Just as the Washington Supreme Court created 
a standard for race discrimination in jury selection that was easier to meet 
than Batson, state courts should adopt a lower discovery standard in the 
selective law enforcement context.  
This Part proposes a state court rule to facilitate discovery in support of 
racially selective law enforcement claims. Section IV.A describes the 
proposed rule (the Rule), which seeks to provide a clear and objective 
standard that can be applied consistently by state courts. Our Rule preserves 
the spirit of Armstrong by including a comparative standard but follows 
Washington and Sellers by eliminating Armstrong’s granular similarly 
situated requirement. Finally, Section IV.B responds to potential criticisms 
of the Rule. 
A. The Proposed Rule 
A new state court rule is preferable to either a state statute or a court 
decision reinterpreting a state constitutional provision. Such a rule would 
enable defendants to investigate race discrimination while avoiding 
legislative gridlock, the vagaries of litigation, and lockstepping. 
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Legislatures, by design, are slow-moving creatures. Much pressure 
must be brought to bear and consensus reached for any progress to be made, 
especially in the criminal justice arena. Texas’s Michael Morton Act, for 
example, was the result of a series of exonerations that “shook the public’s 
trust in the Texas criminal justice system,” as well as an extensive advocacy 
effort by Texas Appleseed and the Texas Defender Service.313 Thus, state 
statutes are not an ideal mechanism for the type of reform needed in the 
selective law enforcement arena. 
Litigation that asks a state court to reinterpret its state constitution is 
also less tangible than it would seem. First, reformers would need to find the 
right case—one with sufficient evidence of discrimination, and with data that 
are accessible before discovery to enable the defendant to develop the record. 
Second, the court would have to swim against the tide of lockstepping. 
Finally, a state supreme court would be unlikely to hear a selective law 
enforcement discovery case if it is already settled law that Armstrong applies. 
Thus, litigation is also a less viable avenue of reform. 
A state supreme court rule akin to Washington’s Rule 37 is therefore 
the best way to enable defendants to obtain discovery regarding race 
discrimination by the police. Such a rule should draw on the framework 
outlined in the recent federal court of appeals cases. 
The first section of our proposed Rule addresses its purpose. The 
remainder of the Rule articulates the discovery standard. 
1. Text 
(a) Purpose. The purpose of this rule is to set the standard for granting 
discovery in support of a racially selective law enforcement claim 
brought by a criminal defendant. A racially selective law enforcement 
claim is a challenge that a particular law enforcement agency or its 
constituent agents violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the equal 
protection provision of the [name of state] constitution. 
 
(b) Required Evidentiary Showing. To obtain discovery, a defendant shall 
present evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference of either 
discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. A defendant need not 




 313 TOWARDS MORE TRANSPARENT JUSTICE, supra note 276, at ii–iii. 
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(1) Discriminatory Effect Showing Sufficient to Obtain Discovery. A 
defendant is entitled to discovery if the defendant presents 
evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference that there is 
a disparity between (i) the racial composition of the “selected 
group” and (ii) the racial composition of the “benchmark 
group.” 
 
(A) Selected Group. The selected group is the defendant and the 
universe of individuals selected by law enforcement officers 
for arrest or citation. 
(B) Benchmark Group. The benchmark group is the general 
population of the relevant geographic area reflected in 
publicly available census data.  
(C) Relevant Geographic Area. The relevant geographic area is 
the geographic area policed by the law enforcement agency 
that arrested or cited the defendant. 
(D) Racial Composition. In determining the racial composition 
of the selected group and the benchmark group, respectively, 
a defendant may aggregate all people of color (nonwhites) or 
provide a more detailed racial breakdown. 
(E) Similarly Situated Showing Not Required to Establish 
Discriminatory Effect. To obtain discovery under this 
section, a defendant is not required to present any evidence 
that there existed similarly situated individuals of a different 
race who were not selected by law enforcement officers for 
arrest or citation, or to present any comparison beyond the 
general population of the relevant geographic area. 
 
(2) Discriminatory Intent Showing Sufficient to Obtain Discovery. A 
defendant is entitled to discovery if the defendant presents 
evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference that the law 
enforcement agency or its agents acted with discriminatory 
intent. 
2. Rationale 
The Rule’s required evidentiary showing charts a middle ground 
between Washington and Sellers on one hand and Armstrong on the other. 
Recall that Armstrong requires a threshold showing of “some evidence” of 
discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. 314  In addition, for 
 
 314 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1996). 
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discriminatory effect, Armstrong requires a defendant to make an impossibly 
granular similarly situated comparison only ever met at the merits stage in 
Yick Wo and rarely met at the discovery stage.315 Washington and Sellers, 
however, set a much lower bar for both prongs, removing the similarly 
situated element of the discriminatory-effect prong and holding that a 
defendant need not prove discriminatory intent.316 
Under the Rule’s section (b), a defendant is entitled to discovery if the 
defendant presents evidence sufficient to create a reasonable inference of 
either discriminatory effect or discriminatory intent. The Rule departs from 
Armstrong in that proof of both prongs is not required. The Rule tracks and 
clarifies Armstrong’s “some evidence” standard by requiring “evidence 
sufficient to create a reasonable inference.”317 
The Rule’s discriminatory-effect section, section (b)(1), maintains a 
requirement that the defendant present evidence of a racial disparity. 
However, like Washington and Sellers, section (b)(1)(E) of the Rule 
eliminates the impossible “similarly situated” requirement, avoiding 
Armstrong’s catch-22. The Rule proposes a clearer discriminatory-effect 
standard than Washington and Sellers. Section (b)(1) expressly requires the 
defendant to present a straightforward comparison “sufficient to create a 
reasonable inference that there is a disparity” between two groups, the 
“selected group” and the “benchmark group.” In addition, section (b)(1)(D) 
enables the defendant to aggregate people of color (nonwhites), rather than 
requiring a more fine-grained analysis. For example, if the selected group is 
40% Black and 50% Hispanic, that group is composed of 90% people of 
color for purposes of the Rule’s comparative standard. 
Sections (b)(1)(A)–(B) lay out the definitions for the “selected group” 
and the “benchmark group.” The “selected group” comprises “the defendant 
and the universe of individuals selected by law enforcement officers for 
arrest or citation.” 318  The “benchmark group” is defined as “the general 
population of the relevant geographic area reflected in publicly available 
 
 315 Id. (first citing Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905); and then citing Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)); see also supra notes 94, 96 and accompanying text.  
 316 See supra notes 148–158 and accompanying text.  
 317 517 U.S. at 468–69.  
 318 Notably, without discovery, it is difficult to ascertain the contours of the selected group, let alone 
the race of each person in the selected group. Recall that information about the selected group was some 
of the very evidence the Armstrong defendants sought in discovery. See supra text accompanying note 
63. The defense may be able to search the court’s electronic docketing system to learn the names of other 
people law enforcement have selected for the same operation, sting, or offense, but that system typically 
does not provide race information. The best way to determine the selected group is therefore to contact 
the public defender’s office and the private bar and gather names, case numbers, and race from every 
single lawyer who represents a client targeted in the particular operation.  
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census data.” Section (b)(1)(C) defines the “relevant geographic area” as the 
“geographic area policed by the law enforcement agency that arrested or 
cited the defendant.” If a law enforcement agency were intentionally 
targeting predominately Black or Hispanic neighborhoods, drawing the 
benchmark group from the particular geographic area where the agency ran 
the operation would mask discrimination. Accordingly, the Rule defines the 
benchmark group more broadly, as all of the people available to be selected 
for arrest by that agency. 
The closely analogous employment discrimination context supports this 
conception of the two groups. In the Title VII context, the statistical question 
is “how many African-Americans should have been hired based on the 
relevant labor market?”319 In a failure-to-hire case, the selected group is the 
universe of nonwhite applicants who were not hired and the benchmark group 
is the relevant labor pool.320 In the selective law enforcement context, the 
question is how many people of color should have been selected (aka 
“hired”) by the law enforcement agency based on the available pool of 
people (the benchmark group). 
Using the general population reflected in census data as the benchmark 
group is justified by the practical realities of a criminal case in which the 
defendant has not yet obtained discovery and therefore does not know the 
law enforcement agency’s selection criteria. Without any information about 
the law enforcement agency’s selection criteria, it is difficult for a defendant 
to identify a more specific benchmark group than the general population. 
Using the general population as the benchmark group is the only way to 
avoid backing defendants into yet another catch-22. As the defendants in 
Davis observed: “The government cannot refuse to disclose its targeting 
criteria and, simultaneously, criticize defendants for using a comparison 
group that does not incorporate those secret criteria.”321 Even if the defendant 
knows that the agency’s selection criteria include, for example, people with 
certain criminal histories, it is extremely difficult to determine the universe 
of people with prior convictions for a particular offense.322 And even if that 
universe of people is identifiable, race data are rarely publicly available.323 
 
 319 E.E.O.C. v. O & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 320 Of course, under Title VII, this question arises at the merits stage. A civil plaintiff is automatically 
entitled to discovery that enables the plaintiff to define the parameters of the selected group and the 
benchmark group. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  
 321 Defendants-Appellees’ Brief, supra note 135, at 30. 
 322 See Starr, supra note 214, at 492 (“[I]t is very hard for litigants to prove racial profiling. . . . In 
federal criminal cases, just getting discovery is notoriously difficult.”). 
 323 See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 643 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the Illinois 
State Police’s citations database “does not record the race of the motorist,” a lacuna that proved fatal to 
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In the Chicago stash house litigation that Professor Siegler led in the district 
court, for example, it took nine months, hundreds of pages of motions, and a 
related civil subpoena enforcement action to obtain the kind of racially coded 
criminal history data needed to construct a benchmark group.324 
The Rule’s use of the general population as the benchmark group is also 
supported by analogizing to employment discrimination law, where “[t]he 
relevant geographic area should be the geographic area from which 
applicants would have come, absent any discrimination.” 325  In the 
employment discrimination context, this means the “immediate locality, 
either the city in which the employer is located, or the surrounding Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Area.”326 There, the benchmark group is defined as 
the general population when the job skill involved is one that many people 
have or can fairly or readily acquire.327 In the selective law enforcement 
context, the general population within the law enforcement agency’s purview 
is likewise the appropriate benchmark group because every member of that 
population is equally “qualified” to commit a crime.328 As Judge Nguyen 
explained in Sellers, “There is no reason to suspect that persons of a 
particular race are more likely to agree to commit a stash house robbery 
unless one believes that persons of that race are inherently more prone to 
 
the plaintiffs’ claim: “Without comparative racial information, plaintiffs can not prove that they were 
stopped, detained, or searched, when similarly situated whites were not”); Report of Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, 
Ph.D., supra note 9, at 7 (“Both sources of criminal history information provided for this litigation have 
limited or no information on the Hispanic ethnicity either of the defendants or the [benchmark] 
population.”). As Professor Sonja Starr remarks: 
Often . . . the limits of available data will mean that it is just not possible to determine whether 
the police are discriminating based on race. These research challenges are also problems for 
courts, litigants challenging such discrimination, and police departments themselves as they seek 
to comply with their constitutional obligations. 
Starr, supra note 214, at 487.  
 324 See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text.  
 325 RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & JASON R. BENT, THE STATISTICS OF DISCRIMINATION § 4.4 (2019).  
 326 2 JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
§ 20:9 (2020); see also E.E.O.C. v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 303 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Because of this flaw, and because the comparison was not restricted to black entry-level workers, we 
believe that the court erred in accepting these comparisons based upon ‘relevant labor markets’ smaller 
than Chicago.”). 
 327  See 8 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 107:122 (2020) (first citing 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977); and then citing E.E.O.C. v. Rath 
Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 336 (8th Cir. 1986)).  
 328 This is especially true when the prosecution refuses to disclose the law enforcement agency’s 
selection criteria, making it difficult to identify a narrower benchmark group than the general population.  
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committing violent crime for profit—a dangerously racist view that has no 
place in the law.”329 
Unlike United States v. Lopez,330 section (b)(1) of the Rule does not 
require that the racial disparity between the selected group and the 
benchmark group be statistically significant. It is true that in the Title VII 
context, the Supreme Court has held that “a prima facie case of disparate-
impact liability” is essentially “a threshold showing of a significant statistical 
disparity, and nothing more.”331 This standard, however, applies at the merits 
stage, after the plaintiff has gained discovery under the broad civil standard. 
Statistical significance is an unreasonable gatekeeper at the discovery 
stage of a criminal case. Traditionally, courts require statistical significance 
at the 5% level (a p-value of 0.05 or less), the standard for publishing an 
empirical study in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.332 In the selective law 
enforcement context, the p-value represents the probability that the level of 
racial disparity observed in the defendant’s data would appear by random 
chance alone—that is, if race played no role in law enforcement’s 
decisions. 333  Although courts employ this demanding standard in other 
contexts, statistical significance at any level has no place in a discovery 
standard that applies before the defendant has received any data. 334 
Defendants seeking discovery about discrimination should not have to 
establish discrimination with the degree of confidence required for statistical 
significance. 
Requiring a defendant who has not obtained any discovery to meet the 
same standard as an academic seeking to publish a study in a peer-reviewed 
 
 329 United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 860 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J., concurring). 
 330 See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.  
 331 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 587 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 332 Jonah B. Gelbach, Estimation Evidence, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 553 (2020) (“[C]ourts frequently 
focus on conventional hypothesis testing . . . at the significance level of 5%, because that is the approach 
many statistics-using scholars take in their scholarly activities.”). 
 333 David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1337–39 
(1986) (“[A] significance test determines whether an observed result is so unlikely to have occurred by 
chance alone that it is reasonable to attribute the result to something else.”); David H. Kaye & David A. 
Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 250 (3d 
ed. 2011) (“The p-value is the probability of getting data as extreme as, or more extreme than, the actual 
data—given that the null hypothesis is true.”). 
 334 Empirical evidence in the civil context suggests that “using conventional hypothesis testing with 
the most common significance level, 5%, is tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to present evidence 
powerful enough to convince the plaintiff’s most favorable juror that there is at least a 79% chance the 
plaintiff’s litigation position is correct.” Gelbach, supra note 332, at 581; see also Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1511 (1999) (“The five percent 
convention is rooted in considerations that have no direct relevance to litigation, such as the need to ration 
pages in scientific journals.”). 
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journal will lead to the same result as Armstrong—it will block potentially 
meritorious claims.335 Such a high standard raises a serious risk that courts 
will incorrectly assume that no discrimination exists when discrimination is, 
in fact, afoot. Courts instead should look to whether the defendant has 
created a reasonable inference that a disparity exists. If a defendant can show 
that the police are targeting people of color at a rate greater than their 
representation in the general population, judges should grant discovery. 
Additionally, requiring statistical significance is impractical at the 
discovery stage of a criminal case. To establish a statistically significant 
disparity, a defendant would have to hire an expensive expert to produce a 
report. But many criminal defendants are indigent and would have to petition 
the court to appoint an expert.336 If the defendant succeeded in obtaining an 
expert, the government would also hire an expensive expert to produce a 
report contending that the defendant had not shown a statistically significant 
disparity. And all of this would occur before the defendant had obtained any 
discovery. 
Section (b)(1)(E) further tracks Davis, Washington, and Sellers by not 
requiring the defendant to identify either a granular similarly situated 
benchmark group or particular similarly situated individuals—that is, 
specific people—who were not targeted by law enforcement.337 This choice 
recognizes that Armstrong’s similarly situated requirement is neither 
appropriate nor feasible at the discovery stage of a selective law enforcement 
claim; it is simply impossible for a defendant to point to a particular person 
whom law enforcement chose not to arrest. Professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann 
levies a more structural critique of the similarly situated prong, explaining 
that even “[i]n the face of overwhelming disparate racial impact, litigants are 
still expected to show that the effect of race and race alone can be isolated 
 
 335  Requiring statistical significance thus risks what are known as Type II errors—“finding no 
relationship when one does exist”—in favor of avoiding Type I errors—“finding a relationship—for 
example, between race and decision to prosecute [or arrest]—when none actually exists.” McAdams, 
supra note 22, at 613 n.46. Given that discovery occurs at the fact-finding stage of the case, a forgiving 
standard that risks Type I errors is preferable to a demanding standard that entirely prevents defendants 
from uncovering race discrimination.  
 336 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (authorizing the appointment of experts in indigent criminal 
cases); Jones v. Sterling, 110 P.3d 1271 (Ariz. 2005) (denying defendants’ motion for an expert in a 
selective law enforcement case); McAdams, supra note 22, at 621 (“Defendants who are not wealthy 
enough to produce their own survey cannot meet the similarly situated standard.”). In Professor Siegler’s 
stash house litigation, for example, “the Court also granted Defendants’ motion for the appointment of a 
top expert, Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, to conduct a statistical analysis of the stash house cases in this District to 
determine whether there were statistically significant racial anomalies.” Order at 2, United States v. 
Brown, No. 12-CR-0632-RC (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2017), ECF No. 581. 
 337 See supra Section II.B.2.  
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from other factors to support a counterfactual causal account of 
discrimination.” 338  Eliminating this requirement allows for a fairer 
assessment of discriminatory effect. 
Section (b)(2) of the Rule does not require a discriminatory-intent 
showing at the discovery stage, in keeping with Washington and Sellers. The 
Rule thus has the same effect as Washington’s Rule 37, which removed the 
discriminatory-intent requirement in the jury-selection context and 
substituted an “objective observer” test.339  
Following Sellers, section (b)(2) nevertheless preserves the opportunity 
for a defendant to present evidence “sufficient to create a reasonable 
inference” of discriminatory intent in order to obtain discovery.   
Although our Rule is silent on the type of evidence that can meet this 
requirement, statistical evidence is relevant here, too. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s holding in McCleskey v. Kemp that nonstatistical evidence is 
required to demonstrate discriminatory intent, that case, like Armstrong, 
arose in the selective prosecution context340 and has been interpreted to blunt 
the force of statistical evidence in the selective law enforcement context.341 
We agree with Professor Aziz Huq that statistical evidence can provide 
evidence of discrimination, including discriminatory intent. 342  All of the 
reasons for limiting Armstrong to the selective prosecution context apply 
equally to McCleskey. In short, the Court’s prohibition on the use of statistics 




 338 Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 165, at 1190–91. After discovery, at the merits stage, the similarly 
situated standard is even more problematic because “it is not difficult for law enforcement to come 
forward with plausible bases to distinguish potential targets as not ‘similarly situated,’ especially post hoc 
and especially when there are highly unequal distributions between groups of variables that are plausibly 
rational for law enforcement to consider, such as residence in high crime neighborhoods or criminal 
history.” Id. at 1191 (discussing the Chicago stash house litigation). 
 339 See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text.  
 340 481 U.S. 279, 289, 298–99 (1987) (holding that the “racially disproportionate impact” in the 
administration of the death penalty in Georgia was not enough to overturn the defendant’s guilty verdict 
absent a showing of “racially discriminatory purpose”).  
 341 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing McCleskey, 
481 U.S. at 298). 
 342 Huq, supra note 92, at 1283 (“[T]he judge tasked with investigating discriminatory intent should 
embrace statistical findings for their modest, but important, role of evidentiary support[,] . . . [particularly 
since] animus and statistical discrimination are often best flushed out using econometric tools.”). 
 343 See Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 996 n.14 (discussing this position). The authors will flesh out this 
argument in a future paper. 
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*          *          * 
 
By requiring a comparison between the selected group and the 
benchmark group, the Rule tracks the ultimate merits standard for selective 
law enforcement and thus is still guided by the “spirit of Armstrong.”344 At 
the same time, the Rule also recognizes a key real-world limitation—a more 
granular comparison is impossible without discovery. As a result, the 
comparative showing required by the Rule utilizes publicly available census 
data and can be done without an expert. The Rule leaves any assessment of 
the quantum of evidence needed to create a reasonable inference of 
discriminatory effect to the discretion of the trial judge. 
B. Response to Critiques 
This Rule may generate some resistance. After all, state appellate courts 
have traditionally applied Armstrong in the selective law enforcement 
context.345 
A comparison with Washington’s Rule 37 is instructive. In that context, 
critics worried that an expanded Batson standard would open the floodgates 
to meritless challenges.346 Of course, in the Batson context, some peremptory 
strikes are driven by implicit—or even explicit—bias. If these challenges 
have merit, opening the floodgates is a good thing because it curbs 
discrimination. State and federal judges alike have expressed concern that 
Batson’s high standard blocks meritorious claims, observing that it is 
vanishingly rare for Batson challenges to be granted or upheld. 347  Many 
scholars agree that the Batson standard is so high as to be virtually 
unmeetable. 348  The ACLU’s contribution to the Washington Workgroup 
 
 344 United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 220 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 345 See supra Section III.A.  
 346 See Franklin L. Dacca, Individual Statement, in WORKGROUP FINAL REPORT, supra note 251, at 
24, 25–26 (contending that the proposed standard would “create an unworkable voir dire process subject 
to lengthy interruptions, delay, confusion and inappropriate scrutiny of individual jurors”). 
 347 See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 335 (Wash. 2013) (plurality opinion) (“In over 40 cases 
since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a conviction based on a trial court’s 
erroneous denial of a Batson challenge.”), abrogated on other grounds by City of Seattle v. Erickson, 
398 P.3d 1124 (Wash. 2017); People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 203 (Cal. 2017) (Liu, J., concurring) 
(“Today’s decision is the first time in 16 years, and the second time in over 25 years, that this court has 
found a Batson/Wheeler violation.”); Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832, 846 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) 
(Costa, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly two of the hundreds of Batson decisions in our circuit have ever found 
that a strike was discriminatory . . . .”). 
 348 See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 
93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2008) (arguing “Batson’s promise of protection against racially 
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Report challenged the floodgates concern, arguing that it was necessary to 
lower the burden for raising race-based objections to peremptory challenges 
given that “the history of racial discrimination and need for strict regulation 
are well-established.”349 The ACLU also pointed out the difficulty of proving 
race discrimination under Batson.350 A similar justification was given for 
using the lower “objective observer” standard of proof for a New Jersey anti-
corruption law.351 
The issue our Rule seeks to address—race discrimination by law 
enforcement—is likewise well documented.352  It is clear from the recent 
wave of selective law enforcement challenges in federal stash house cases 
that the Armstrong standard makes it extremely difficult for defendants to 
obtain discovery, let alone prove such claims on the merits.353 Critics might 
argue that the Rule overcorrects because laws are often enforced 
disproportionately against people of color. As a result, the Rule’s standard 
will almost always be met when a defendant is a person of color. However, 
the Rule’s “reasonable inference” standard does not open the floodgates by 
allowing discovery in every case because defendants must be targeted for a 
particular crime or as part of a law enforcement operation that creates a 
sufficiently large selected group. This limits the Rule’s application to only a 
subset of cases. Finally, while the Rule relaxes the discovery standard, it does 
not prevent a court from weeding out potentially meritless claims by 
applying Armstrong’s demanding two-pronged standard at the merits stage 
of a selective law enforcement challenge. 
Another possible objection is that our proposed Rule would be outside 
the power of a state court’s rulemaking authority. That authority is 
commonly limited by either statutory or constitutional provisions. Like the 
 
discriminatory jury selection has not been realized”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 248, at 1077 (“The 
current [Batson] framework makes it exceedingly difficult for judges to reject even the most spurious of 
peremptory strikes . . . .”); id. at 1092 (“Our analysis reveals that of 269 federal decisions between 2000 
and 2009, the reviewing court granted a new trial in only eighteen cases—6.69% of the total.”).  
 349 ACLU of Wash., Wash. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Law., Fred T. Korematsu Ctr. for L. & Equal., Legal 
Voice, Loren Miller Bar Ass’n & Latino/a Bar Ass’n of Wash., Statement, in WORKGROUP FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 251, at 28, 28–29. 
 350 Id. at 29.  
 351 See In re Pontoriero, 106 A.3d 532, 543 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (explaining that the 
“risk of actual corruption,” which is notoriously difficult to prove, merited an objective observer 
standard).  
 352 See supra note 105. 
 353 See supra Section II.B. 
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federal Rules Enabling Act,354 many state statutes, constitutions, and cases 
prohibit courts from changing substantive rights.355 
The proposed Rule does not violate state courts’ rulemaking authority 
because it does not create a new substantive discovery right for defendants. 
Rather, it merely elaborates on the pathways for obtaining relevant evidence. 
In the federal context, the Supreme Court has upheld the authority of district 
courts to promulgate local rules unless they conflict with an Act of Congress 
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, they are constitutionally 
unfounded, or the subject matter governed by the rule is not within the power 
of the district court to regulate.356 States interpret the authority of their courts 
to promulgate rules in the same way, as many state discovery provisions are 
based on the federal rules.357 For example, a California court has explained 
that “courts may institute only those local rules that are ‘not inconsistent with 
law or with the rules adopted and prescribed by the Judicial Council.’”358 
The Rule we propose does not conflict with existing state court rules 
because state rules regarding the scope of discovery in criminal cases set a 
 
 354 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (limiting federal courts’ ability to “prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure” to rules that do not “abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right”). 
 355 For examples of state statutes, see TENN. CODE § 16-3-403; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.109; NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 2.120.2; and WIS. STAT. § 751.12. For examples in state constitutions, see MO. CONST. art. 
V, § 5; ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.111; and OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). For examples of state court 
decisions, see State v. Beam, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (Idaho 1992), which states that the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s rulemaking power relates to procedural, not substantive matters. For a fifty-state survey of state 
rules enabling acts, see Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W.2d 977, 996–1003 (Mo. 1937).  
 356 Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1355 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Supreme 
Court has upheld the authority of district courts to promulgate local rules unless 1) the rule conflicts with 
an Act of Congress; 2) the rule conflicts with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; 3) the rule is 
constitutionally infirm; or 4) the subject matter governed by the rule is not within the power of the district 
court to regulate.” (first citing Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 654 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); 
then citing Miner v. Atlas, 363 U.S. 641, 651–52 (1960); and then citing Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. 
359, 368 (1839))). 
 357 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (“[Rule 16] 
is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which parties are entitled. It is not intended 
to limit the judge’s discretion to order broader discovery . . . .”); State v. McIntosh, 58 P.3d 716, 724 
(Kan. 2002) (explaining that the Kansas criminal discovery rule is “based on Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 16” and 
“is not all-inclusive”); Green v. State, 835 S.E.2d 238, 243 n.10 (Ga. 2019) (observing that Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 16 “includes language materially similar to” Georgia’s criminal discovery statute); 
State v. Peters, No. E2014-02322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 6768615, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 
2015) (“In determining whether the requested discovery is material, this Court has looked to federal 
authority interpreting the analogous Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a).”). 
 358  In re Harley C., 249 Cal. Rptr. 3d 783, 788 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 68070(a)); see also, e.g., Trib. Rev. Publ’g Co. v. Thomas, 120 F. Supp. 362, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1954) 
(describing a Pennsylvania statue authorizing state courts to establish rules so long as “such rules shall 
not be inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of this commonwealth”). 
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floor, not a ceiling, on how much discovery courts may order.359 Nor is there 
much risk of a constitutional conflict. The Rule would only pose a potential 
constitutional conflict when a state court has held that Armstrong’s discovery 
standard applies to selective law enforcement claims. Most states have not 
independently decided whether Armstrong applies to selective law 
enforcement claims brought under their state constitution.360 The few states 
that have applied Armstrong to the selective law enforcement context have 
done so only in response to claims under the federal Equal Protection 
Clause.361 In those states, there is no conflict so long as the Rule is limited to 
the state constitution’s equal protection provision. 
CONCLUSION 
 “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”362 Yet, for too long, 
Armstrong’s shadow has obscured any meaningful scrutiny of racial 
discrimination by law enforcement officers. Although the police have 
thousands of interactions with citizens each day, applying the Armstrong 
standard allows their enforcement choices to go unchecked. There must be a 
legal mechanism for criminal defendants to root out racial discrimination, 
whether by federal agents who run fake stash house operations that 
predominantly target people of color363 or police officers who stop drivers of 
color at disproportionate rates.364 Without access to discovery, there is no 
way to police the police in criminal cases. 
Our legal system does not afford law enforcement officers the same 
privileges as prosecutors, but that distinction has long gone unrecognized in 
the doctrine. Three federal courts of appeals have now acknowledged this 
distinction and have taken the important step of lowering the standard for 
 
 359 See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1974 Amendment, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; see also 
Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59, 114 
(2017) (surveying the expansion of discovery obligations under local rules).  
 360  Only the Arizona Supreme Court has independently decided this question under its state’s 
constitution. See supra notes 240–244 and accompanying text.  
 361 See supra notes 233–239 and accompanying text. 
 362 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (Nat’l Home Libr. Found. 1933). 
 363 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 364 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 105, at 267 (“[I]nterviews reveal that African-Americans strongly 
believe that they are stopped and ticketed more often than whites, and the data from Ohio and elsewhere 
show that they are right.”). One of the first successful selective law enforcement claims was brought in 
State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996), where the court held that defendants 
had established a prima facie case of selective enforcement of traffic laws. Soto, which was handed down 
two months before Armstrong, had far-ranging effects within New Jersey. It led to a review of the law 
enforcement practices of the New Jersey State Police, which led a New Jersey judge to conclude “that 
defendants perceived to be African-American, Black or Hispanic are entitled to discovery [regarding 
racial profiling] for motor vehicle stops that originated as a result of observations made by [New Jersey] 
State Troopers.” State v. Lee, 920 A.2d 80, 82 (N.J. 2007).  
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defendants seeking discovery in support of claims of racially selective law 
enforcement. Other federal and state courts should follow suit. The Chicago 
stash house litigation in Leslie Mayfield’s case and others demonstrates that 
a lower discovery standard has an immense impact on criminal defendants 
and advances the integrity of the legal system. 
But federal courts alone will not bring us out of Armstrong’s shadow. 
State courts see many more criminal cases than federal courts and have a role 
in reform as well. Our innovative state court Rule would ensure that 
defendants with meritorious claims can obtain the information they need to 
shed light on discrimination by the police. The Rule would thus safeguard 
the equal protection principles that undergird our system and strengthen our 
commitment to racial justice. 
